Incentives for academic teachers in Poland in the context of the multitasking agency model

Abstract

Background: Shaping motivations in the principal-agent relationship is the basis for the effective functioning of both market entities and organizations. The multitasking problem at universities is associated with hidden actions (moral hazard). The inability to constantly monitor the work of an academic teacher and the difficulty in measuring his/her effectiveness are conducive to the emergence of these phenomena. The problem can be solved by a properly designed contract.

Research purpose: The aim of the article is to analyze solutions relating to the system of financing higher education contained in the Act of 20 July 2018 – the Law on Higher Education and Science – in the context of the Multitasking Agency Model. On this basis, proposals for incentive solutions that increase the effectiveness of the Polish academic teacher’s work are presented.

Methods: The article analyzes the multitasking agency model, which is then complemented with empirical data and a description of juridical solutions.

Conclusions: Considering the teachers’ research activities, the incentive system should be based on bonus points for each publication above a given point floor, while linking university funding with the number of students would indicate the need to introduce a similar mechanism for didactic activities.