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## RETHINK THINKING

**Abstract:** The thinking of art creators is considered as part of philosophical reflection on cognitive processes. The author assumes that we are on the limit of the current vision of humanity, which induces us to attempt to "rethink thinking" and the meanings and functions attributed to thinking in cognitive processes. This attempt should include not only conceptual cognition but also "esthetic thinking" in the broad sense and "artistic thinking" connected, although not identical with it. The study examines what role could be played by the concept of "esthetic thinking" in the analysis of changes in art and its theories. The subject of interest is the turning points in thinking that could be connected with transformative experiences taking place in philosophy and art. Several possible directions of such analyses are presented that refer to historical and transformative experiences in thinking brought about by civilizational and technological transformations. Examples are provided of the transforming impact of similar experiences on theory and art.

**Keywords:** esthetic thinking, philosophical thinking, artistic thinking, conceptual cognition, creation, art, esthetic experience, transformative experience, borderline situations, immediacy of cognition, sensuality.

The question *How do artists think?* is a form of a suggestion because it indirectly conveys information that artists think in a different way than others. History of art and philosophical reflection on art adopt the positive assumption that because artistic creation is a special form of human activity and this distinctness cannot be denied, then the thinking of artists (art creators) also has this character. Art theories have defined and assessed this distinctness in different ways. Philosophical esthetics proposes to take a more general look at creative activity as one of particular ways of experiencing, knowing and transforming the world. Paraphrasing the words of Roman Ingarden, we can say

that an artist, like a philosopher, settles "the dispute over the existence of the world". In esthetic conceptions art is defined as a form of human contact with the world, being different from others by evidence (the evident), which enables more direct cognition than intellectual cognition. We are at the stage of introductory deliberation and have already encountered one of several problematic oppositions that contrast artistic cognition with conceptual cognition. Not long ago, the verbal equivalent of direct cognition was the concept of "evidence", etymologically connected with eyesight. The conception of directness derived from language is a narrowing term in comparison with the possibility of artistic cognition. It does not cover music and only partly refers to other fields of art. The point, however, is not in that the world of art is richer than what we see and describe. From the philosophical point of view, it is not most important what we call that which makes artistic thinking different from other forms of thinking, but what the basis of distinction is and whether we can access it. It is not without significance, however, that Western culture has so far associated "ocular" cognition with picture rather than with, e.g., sound, movement, or touch. This is a broad subject, and it is impossible to discuss it here. We are more interested in how the change in describing artistic cognition took place. It should be reminded that already Johann Gottfried Herder said that the sense of sight provides ideas relating only to the surface of things and he paraphrased Descartes' famous saying with the words "I feel! I am" (*Ich fühle mich! Ich bin*). Starting from the avantgarde, art joined the criticism present in philosophy and culture of reality dominated by "higher" senses, which can be clearly observed also at the level of theories that classify new domains of art, using the terms: haptic art, multisensory theater, or, more generally, body art, according to this criterion. In their exhibitions, art institutions also draw attention to direct multisensory involvement of the audience, as in the case of interactive museums and in many other fields of creative activity treated processually. In response to changes in science and art in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, theories challenging the division into purely intellectual and sensory cognition, into higher and lower senses emerged in esthetics - for example, pragmatic esthetics and somaesthetics initiated by John Dewey, and now developed by Richard Shusterman. The need to go beyond the radical opposition between conceptual thinking and other forms of thinking raises no greater controversies, but it is difficult to reach an agreement on the boundaries between them. Regardless of differences in articulating this problem, scholars admit in unison that it is only the beginning of changes in understanding human cognitive functions. Debates inspired by achievements in contemporary anthropology, neurobiology and medicine show how great impact on the positions of theorists exerted by worldview issues and the attitude to philosophical tradition. It is not accidental that they also include views on art entering increasingly closer relations with the achievements

of science and advanced technologies. In explaining the arcana of artistic creation, opinions oscillate between reductionist conceptions (some trends in neuroesthetics and neurobiology), attempts to redefine esthetic experience as a model of experiencing the radically pluralized reality, and metaphysical presentations returning in a new form.

The present text assumes that we are so close to the limit of the current conception of humankind that we should attempt to "rethink thinking". The attempt should comprise both "esthetic thinking" in the broad sense and "artistic thinking" combined, although not identical, with the former. The concept of "esthetic thinking" as a philosophical research category referring to new interpretations of *aisthesis*, extending its area beyond pure sensory sensations towards more complex experiences, can be helpful in reflection on artistic creation, its sources and means of communication. Esthetic thinking is, as a rule, connected with perception, sensation and experience<sup>1</sup>. Etymologically, the term "esthetic thinking" combines the content of *aisthesis* with the work of the mind and conceptual cognition. It is a category broad enough to permit looking at the development of forms in art as a process connected with changes in other areas, without depriving it (i.e., development) of special features but also without reducing the sources of the artistic process to one of the spheres of prereflective sensation. Esthetic thinking is an inspiring research hypothesis that assumes that it is in this form of thinking that paths of different forms of rationality cross. Rethinking artistic thinking from the perspective of esthetic thinking may at the same time serve as an exemplification of general changes occurring in human "thinking about thinking". Further on, we will try to show several possible directions of such analyses.

One of the most important problems, which combines philosophical thinking with esthetic thinking, is the question of changes of the thinking horizon, both in the perspective of long duration and of changes violently occurring under the impact of strong stimuli. The author of the study is interested in turning points in thinking that can be associated with transformative experience. From recent history, we know examples of borderline situations which provoked radical changes in human understanding of the world and cast doubt on the practice of art at the same time. An example can be Adorno's often cited question of whether it is possible to write poetry after Auschwitz. Today, Rafał Czekaj asks a similar question in relation to what happened in Bucha<sup>2</sup>. What decides

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<sup>1</sup> The author of the paper has used excerpts from her text published in a monograph. Cf T. Pękala, *Zadanie myślenia*, in: *Myślenie estetyczne*, eds. T. Pękala, R. Kubicki, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2023, pp.13-24.

<sup>2</sup> R. Czekaj, *Pisanie poezji po Buczy, czyli o konieczności reprezentacji estetycznej*, [in:] *Myślenie estetyczne*, op. cit., pp. 37-46.

about this impossibility? What features of art and experiencing art is this type of question addressed to? What experience calls into question the existence of the world whose part is art? The need to distance oneself from the thinking of predecessors manifests itself when epistemological continuity is close to being broken. The rethinking of thinking is therefore a stage after which a break – "a cut" may take place in the meaning given to this term by Gaston Bachelard<sup>3</sup>.

A condition for rethinking thinking is the awareness of limitations of conceptual cognition in individually experiencing the world, when it (experiencing) no longer finds support in communal representations of thinking, symbols, myths, and theories. Perhaps this is a stage at which also radical changes in art occur. Differences between historical models of thinking, frequently painfully felt, are described as a state of suspension between continuity and discontinuity, break-off and continuation. This is the time of attempts to redefine conceptual cognition in the general cognitive perspective. Do changes in artistic thinking occur at the same time? Can we, faced with global risks, verify the accuracy of the thesis, promoted by latemodernity theorists, about the experience of art as the model of experiencing the radically pluralized reality?

As a matter of fact, the point is always about a specific moment in history, when thinking ceases to be obvious and becomes a question of the philosophy of the times we live in. According to Michel Foucault, this means defining the boundary conditions determining "the current area of possible experience", which makes us aware of the uncertainty of knowledge enclosed within the existing mental structures. In reference to Kant's text about the Enlightenment, Foucault asks "What is going on today? What is going on now? What is the 'now' within which we are all now, and which defines the moment at which I am writing?"<sup>4</sup>. With an intention similar to Foucault's, we ask questions about the present to the advocates of thinking that crosses dualist divisions, and who represent new materialism, phenomenology, structuralism and modernism. We ask about the framework of possible analyses and epistemological obstacles in the discourse of modernity. What is the object of so directed investigations? Who asks questions and who are his/her interlocutors? The difficulty of philosophical thinking in philosophy was accurately explained by Leszek Kołakowski by referring to the myth hidden in the epistemological question: "What did philosophers ask about when they asked whether a thing is outside the perceptual act?"<sup>5</sup> Kołakowski answers that it is no longer the truth, "subject"

3 Cf. G. Bachelard, *Kształtowanie umysłu naukowego. Przyczynek do psychoanalizy wiedzy obiektywnej*, Wydawnictwo słowo/obraz terytoria, Gdańsk 2002.

4 M. Foucault, „Aufklärung” i rewolucja, transl. by L. Wyczański, „Colloquia communia” 1986, no. 4-5, p. 65.

5 L. Kołakowski, *Obecność mitu*, Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, Wrocław 1994, p. 15.

or "object", and not even the "thing" itself but its "presentation", and "it is this presentation that is called reality, always at least partly regarded as inaccessible to language, intellect, or 'I'."<sup>6</sup>

Modern people are aware of the "traps of presentation", but they do not give up the "opportunity to construct and preserve a map that allows them to think about the present world without falling into magical thinking".<sup>7</sup> Demystification of reality and demythologization of modern thinking are likewise not free from the traps of mythologization of the process of "demythologizing". This is pointed out, inter alia, by Gianni Vattimo in the context of society's transition from modernity to postmodernity.<sup>8</sup> The pivot that holds the tradition together, starting from Friedrich Nietzsche and Heidegger in philosophy, and from Alexander G. Baumgarten in esthetics, is the problem, classical in its origin, of the inaccessibility of conceptual cognition to the individuality of that which is being cognized. Regret over the limitations of human cognition, sometimes dramatically expressed by philosophers, has lost its creative potential. The author of the paper believes that the potential of esthetic thinking is still underestimated, but at the same time has no illusions that the establishment of esthetics in the role of the first philosophy of our times may give the discussion a fresh course.<sup>9</sup> It is no longer possible to practice philosophy using the rhetoric of the fundamental source of sense for two reasons. First, the depth of the source turns out to be unmeasurable in the context of general knowledge about humankind. Secondly, the need for sense cannot be answered within the framework of pure theory.<sup>10</sup> The author largely agrees with Martin Seel's conviction that there is no point in playing the allegedly delicate empiricism of esthetic overview against hard conceptual cognition.<sup>11</sup> She also prefers the

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> The author uses the term „presentation” rather than the interchangeable term „representation” because she believes that presentation has a broader scope and is historically more justified for the problems discussed in the present study. In Polish publications, the decisive factor is the source of translation, not always directly from the original language. The author agrees with the opinion of scholars who distinguish between the two terms used in literature, although she believes that a linguistic convention, if consistently applied, is not a mistake. The use of two categories can be helpful in sorting out different meanings assigned by various authors to the term „representation crisis” as opposed to „presentation crisis”. Cf. A. Doda-Wyszyńska, *Pułapki przedstawienia. Filozofia przez pryzmat praktyk montażu pojęć*, Wydawnictwo UAM, Poznań 2016, p. 118.

<sup>8</sup> G. Vattimo, *Spółczesność przejrzyste*, transl. by M. Kamińska, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej Edukacji TWP, Wrocław 2006, pp. 52-54.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. T. Pękala, *Estetyka jako filozofia pierwsza*, „Kultura Współczesna”, no. 2-3 (28-29) 2001, eds. A. Jawłowska, A. Zeidler-Janiszewska, Warszawa 2001, pp. 207-215.

<sup>10</sup> In this book, cf. W. Lorenc, *Obietnica sensu nawiązująca do sztuki. Theodora Adorna propozycja myślenia „solidarnego z metafizyką w momencie jej upadku”*.

<sup>11</sup> M. Seel, *Estetyka obecności fenomenalnej*, transl. by K. Krzemieniowa, Universitas, Kraków 2008, p. 67.

fusion of the mental horizons of philosophy and detailed sciences in order to open reflections on human thinking in the perspective of its ties with the world rather than in opposition to it. This applies, in equal measure, to thinking in art and thinking about art. Contemporary interpretations of esthetic experience go beyond the bipolar strategies of the myth of the esthetic. This bipolarity, exemplified by philosophy of art, is seeking its place today after the sensory turn and the affective turn of the 1980s and 1990s.

The author of the paper refers to esthetics not only because of her own research interests. She thinks that the changing understanding of cognition in the history of philosophy can be treated as an instructive record of attempts to go beyond the limitation of conceptual cognition. Differently justified returns to *aisthesis* could be an illustration of how turns in thinking about thinking take place. Changes in art have often been the inspiration for the rethinking of thinking. Several crucial turning points which changed the direction of philosophical thinking and initiated criticism of the traditional model of rationality can be distinguished in the discourse of modernity. This paper will only present those that stemmed from transformative historical experiences. The idea of transformative experience was taken from the concept of the American scholar L. A. Paul<sup>12</sup> and, following in the footsteps of theorists who broaden the meaning of this category, the author of the paper tries to use it to describe philosophical thinking.<sup>13</sup>

First, these are "epistemically transforming experiences that were inaccessible before and that provide the previously inaccessible forms or degrees of knowledge and understanding". Second, these are "personally transforming experiences, fundamentally changing the professed values, preferences, desires and, consequently, transforming one's own identity".<sup>14</sup> World War Two, with its indescribable genocide and death camps, was such an experience for philosophers, intellectuals, and artists.

According to Lyotard, WWII questioned the philosophical sense of historical consciousness, placing it in the present and negating the possibility of being outside.<sup>15</sup> It was especially strongly impressed on the philosophy of first-hand witnesses to Nazism. Even in such situations we have only spoken accounts at our disposal. Being a witness to, witnessing "something" entails leaving something not-entirely-told or an order to remain silent. The author of

<sup>12</sup> L.A. Paul, *Transformative Experience*, UOP Oxford 2016.

<sup>13</sup> At this point, the author signals only the possibility of applying the term „transformative experience” for the purposes of philosophy and esthetics.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. H. Carel, J. Kidd, *Expanding Transformative Experience*, „European Journal of Philosophy”, 2019, p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. J. F. Lyotard, *Fenomenologia*, transl. by J. Migasiński, KR, Warszawa 2000, p. 141.

the paper has chosen the conceptions of Heidegger and Hannah Arendt out of examples of the transforming influence of similar experiences upon theory, as they clearly illustrate the borderline moment after which it is not possible "to derive the later from the earlier".<sup>16</sup> The two conceptions also introduce us to the axiological problems of the present, which will be referred to in the final part of the article. Historical theories can be treated as a testimony to the times, but also as a methodological instruction of how to carry out the task of thinking about thinking in ongoing reality. In this context, it is worth referring to the hermeneutic warning that requires us to remember about the historicity of the question: "What remains unthought, however, both in the thing as well as in the method of philosophy?".<sup>17</sup> Regardless of by how many conditions Heidegger's question should be secured, its content accurately illustrates the time when the centuries-old tradition of seeking certainty is crumbling in Western philosophical thought. In opposition to the stable ground are uniqueness and transience as the time of the community of being and thought, i.e., the presence and reception of this "what" in connection with this "how". "Owing to this relationship, the thought can be valid at all".<sup>18</sup> Heidegger asks: "What does 'ratio' mean?" Can this be satisfactorily settled without experiencing this special state of play between the present and the hidden? "As long as it is not known what exactly 'ratio' and rationality are, the accusation of irrationalism will be groundless".<sup>19</sup> For theories that associate artistic activity with the extra-rational, it is worth quoting the statement that there is perhaps "a kind of thinking beyond the distinction between the rational and the irrational [...]".<sup>20</sup> Does such context allow the time for artistic thinking? Heidegger, worried about allowing the Being (das Sein) to come to the fore, allows a change of "thinking about thinking" but in the conditional mode, streaked with fear. He is afraid of the unknown because it is at the level of the Being that the order is disturbed whose guarantee was that which is [is physically existent = being] (das Seiende).<sup>21</sup>

Therefore, it appears that historical experience was transformative in this case exclusively in the first of the indicated meanings. It is difficult not to feel

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<sup>16</sup> Cf. D. Leszczyński, *Filozofia nauki Gastona Bachelarda*, afterword: G. Bachelard, *Kształtowanie umysłu naukowego. Przyczynek do psychoanalizy wiedzy obiektywnej*, Wydawnictwo słowol obraz terytoria, Gdańsk 2002, pp. 337-339.

<sup>17</sup> M. Heidegger, *Koniec filozofii i zadanie myślenia*, „Teksty: teoria literatury, krytyka, interpretacja”, 1976, no. 4-5 (28-29), Wydawnictwo IBL PAN, 9-26, p.11.

<sup>18</sup> M. Heidegger, *Koniec filozofii i zadanie myślenia*, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 18.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p. 19.

<sup>21</sup> Regarding problems with the translation of the two basic terms used by Heidegger, cf.: D. R. Sobota, *Bycie czy byt? O dwóch podstawowych terminach filozofii Heideggera i problemach z ich polskimi przekładami*, „Analiza i Egzystencja”, (31) 2015, pp. 65-96.



a worrying reflection of how attached to its reasons must be theory that requires confrontation with the agony of humanity in order to take up the task of rethinking its foundations. One could even ask to what extent the space must part between experience and the "world picture" developed on the impermanent crumbling ground, for the concept of the contemporary human as the subject to change. Is Heidegger's opening to the language of art caused only by the mechanism of repression and the defense of his own way at the turning point of history? Regardless of answers, for which there is no room here, it is worth reflecting on whether art can fulfill the hope of expressing the sense between the fully expressible and the not-entirely told. Does Heidegger's metaphor of the world as a picture provide the understanding of one kind of experience in the language of another kind of experience? What arguments show the exhaustion of the previous understanding of directness identified with the pictorial condition?

Hannah Arendt continues Heidegger's attempt to rethink thinking. She draws our attention to the dangers of artificial separation of the human world from the natural environment, arguing that "life itself is outside of this artificial world and through life man remains related to all other living organisms".<sup>22</sup> In the shadow of the still lasting experiences of World War II, the sources of anxiety were, inter alia, the hard-to-predict effects of civilizational progress. In the eyes of Arendt, the future human "seems to be possessed by a rebellion against human existence as it has been given, a free gift [...] which he wishes to exchange, as it were, for something he has made himself".<sup>23</sup>

Arendt expected that this might lead to a situation of parting between technological knowledge, practical know-how and thinking. The risk, according to Arendt, is not so much dependence on the world on technology, but confining thinking to the knowledge of "how" (know-how), thus making human a mindless being.<sup>24</sup> Interesting and inspiring from the viewpoint of the present time is entrusting philosophy with the task of reflecting on the "life of the mind".<sup>25</sup> Although Arendt thought that the "life of the mind" sounded pretentious, she did not use this metaphor by accident.<sup>26</sup> From the viewpoint of the contem-

<sup>22</sup> H. Arendt, M. Canovan, *The Human Condition*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1998, second edition, [https://monoskop.org/images/e/e2/Arendt\\_Hannah\\_The\\_Human\\_Condition\\_2nd\\_1998.pdf](https://monoskop.org/images/e/e2/Arendt_Hannah_The_Human_Condition_2nd_1998.pdf), p. 2, [accessed: 25.06.2023].

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>24</sup> Interpretation of the biological dimension of humanity in Arendt's conception is treated one time as a positive treatise on active humankind, and another time as a pessimistic vision in terms of degradation of humanity. Cf. Z. Piątek, *Kondycja ludzka jako podstawa instrumentalnego stosunku człowieka do środowiska*, „Diametros”, 2006, no. 9, pp. 116-125.

<sup>25</sup> H. Arendt, *Myślenie*, transl. by H. Buczyńska-Garewicz, Czytelnik, Warszawa 1981, p. 33.

<sup>26</sup> S. Weigel, *Poetics as a Presupposition of Philosophy: Hannah Arendt's „Denktagebuch”*, „Telos” 2009, 146, pp. 97-110.



porary world, with its experiences and fears, the "life of the mind" gains new content, and again becomes a living metaphor because it includes the world of the mind in the dynamic changing process. The problem lies in that such a metaphor can be described only by means of metaphorical language. Nevertheless, it directs our attention towards new sense which is not reducible to conventional meaning. In the context of new media art and artificial intelligence, it may arouse anxiety about the life of the human mind as a creator. It appears that we have crossed another threshold in creating relations between humanity and its environment. Now it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between the biological and the artificially produced. Without doubt, we are approaching or are already at the stage of developing new forms of perception and thinking, and redefining the already existing ones. The processes we are witnessing can be regarded as favorable ground for transformative experiences in understanding the human condition. From this viewpoint, reconstruction and orderly organization is also demanded by the complex picture of the most recent art, which enters diverse relationships with modern technologies, utilizes scientific achievements to build transmedia spaces and changes the human environment as well as the way of understanding the concept of creation. The rethinking of thinking is just as important in this area as the analysis of the work of the mind, with which the issues of creation and imagination are inherently connected. They take part in creating new spaces and tools of artistic creation<sup>27</sup>. In this context, the discussion on artistic thinking in *Second Life*, *MEART*, nanotechnology in art, robotic art, cyberart, or bio-art<sup>28</sup> can be inspiring, albeit by necessity impossible to examine within this article. Hybridity is worrying as the condition of not artistic fiction but as an attempt to establish a new reality using a biological medium. Artists who explore the limits of corporality and feeling embark on the important and topical subject of global problems concerning the effects of scientific discoveries and the influence of new technologies upon the human world. We think that, just as in the historical transformative experiences mentioned above, in which the point of reference was, inter alia, the question about art, philosophical reflection was used, so also at present it is worth seeking research tools for this type of problems in the conceptions of John Dewey, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Richard Shusterman. These conceptions and their reception set the direction to thinking about art in terms of process and experience, thus laying the ground for interpreting new media art. It is not for the first time that rethinking of thinking simultaneously takes place in philosophy and art.

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<sup>27</sup> There is already extensive literature on the subject, the latest items being: cf. *Mixed Realities. Neue Wirklichkeiten in der Kunst*, „Kunstforum”, 2023, no. 290.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Nervoplastica. Guy Ben-Ary. Sztuka biorobotyczna i jej konteksty kulturowe*, ed. R. W. Kluszczyński, CSW Łaźnia, Gdańsk 2015.

Transformative experiences include both esthetic and philosophical thinking. In contemporary philosophy, *ratio* opens increasingly often to cognitive forms that provide non-discursive knowledge, but, unlike in the past, *ratio* does not seek it in intuition or revelation but in sensuality and direct experience of the world. Reality interests us to a lesser extent as the being (*das Seiende*), and more as the forms assumed by things that make the world about which we are unable to judge in purely rational terms. It turns out again that there is no room for "recognition" of what is happening in the human cognitive horizon. Reality enters life as the "un-thinkable" world in everyday practice as well. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, at the time after the pandemic and during the war in Ukraine, similar events still surprise us by their borderline character and menacing strangeness. In addition to borderline situations arising from global threats, the boundaries of previous human experiences are also crossed in daily practice in contact with new technologies. How should the task of thinking be understood in this context? The author of the paper is decidedly for redefining the category of thinking, expanding it with the "sensual sense" and pre-reflective perception, but at the same time she fears that such an action at the level of discourse will not free us from the feeling of being lost, which may cause cheerful wordless wandering to become another dis-enchantment. This will happen if we continue to believe that the nature of humans as thinking beings is fundamentally different from the world around them. In his work with a symptomatic title, *We Have Never Been Modern*, Bruno Latour asks: "Are you not fed up with finding yourselves forever locked into language alone, or imprisoned in social representations alone [...]?"<sup>29</sup>

Even if this is the case, previous attempts to escape from the "language prison" do not inspire optimism. The metaphor of a human "locked up" in language has been losing its potential since the modern period has made us aware that this is a form of anthropic self-imprisonment.<sup>30</sup> Selfliberation may take place when we look at language as an evolutionary gift, and at humans as beings fundamentally connected with the world. We should thus try to think about language as a shelter in which concepts are born. We are their creators. An invigorating tone sounds beautiful in the Deleuze/Guattari duo: "Concepts do not wait for us ready-made [...]. There is no heaven for concepts".<sup>31</sup> Concepts are absolute and relative at the same time. They are an act, a thought developing in time, they are incorporeal, although they materialize in bodies. Their

<sup>29</sup> B. Latour, *Nigdy nie byliśmy nowocześni. Studium z antropologii symetrycznej*, transl. by M. Gdula, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2011, p. 128.

<sup>30</sup> W. Welsch, *Estetyka poza estetyką. O nową postać estetyki*, transl. by K. Guczalska, Universitas, Kraków 2005, p. 212.

<sup>31</sup> G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, *Co to jest filozofia?*, transl. by P. Pieniążek, Wydawnictwo słowo/obraz terytoria, Gdańsk 2000, p. 12.

state is "transient flight". Even on bridges that link one concept to another there are intersections or bypasses that do not mark the limits to any discursive whole.<sup>32</sup> This is definitely a more constructive starting point than the lament over being locked up in the world of concepts. The life of the mind proceeds over such rocking bridges that arouse uncertainty regarding whether we will reach the other bank and what awaits us there. We accept this uncertainty because an event is ahead of concepts, it does not wait for them. Art "occurs" before discourse on art emerges. At such a moment, thoughts and events are in the wobbly space between the two banks of the rocking bridge. It becomes broken in borderline situations. Artists and philosophers try to find themselves in the new situation and express its sense. The human practice of taking refuge in concepts is part of the world that is not identical with the "meaning of the word world", but is the seat of thoughts and experiences, feelings and pre-reflective sensations.<sup>33</sup> The rethinking of thinking cannot therefore be confined to rethinking concepts and meanings; it requires a comprehensive look, the awareness of rocking bridges. In the context of that which is human, one cannot fail to remember that all experience takes place at some here and now, and it is worth asking the question to what extent the inherited theories and the inherited concept of humanity are – as Vincent Descombes aptly points out – penetrative in perceiving the "difference between an actual experience and a simply possible experience".<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Ibid*, p. 31.

<sup>33</sup> An interesting perspective is offered by the analysis of immersive experiences in the real world. Immersion points to the dynamic of the connection between body, subject, and the world, in which stimulation of the senses intermingles with consciousness. Cf. M., Auvray, Ph. Fuchs, *Perception, immersion et interactions sensorimotrices en environnement virtuel*, *Intellectica*, 2007/1, 45, pp. 23–35. <https://intellectica.org/SiteArchives/archives/n45/45-1-Auvray.pdf> [accessed: 24.01.2023].

<sup>34</sup> V. Descombes, *To samo i inne. Czterdzieści pięć lat filozofii francuskiej (1933-1978)*, transl. by B. Banasiak, K. Matuszewski, Wydawnictwo Spacja, Warszawa 1996, p. 186.

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## PRZEMYŚLEĆ MYŚLENIE (streszczenie)

Myślenie twórców sztuki rozważane jest w ramach filozoficznej refleksji nad procesami poznawczymi. Autorka wychodzi z założenia, że znajdujemy się na granicy dotychczasowej wizji człowieka, co skłania do podjęcia próby „przemyslenia myślenia”, przypisywanych myśleniu znaczeń i funkcji w procesach poznawczych. Powinna ona obejmować nie tylko poznanie pojęciowe, ale też szeroko rozumiane „myślenie estetyczne” i połączone z nim (choć nie tożsame) „myślenie artystyczne”. Rozpatrywane jest, jaką rolę w analizie przemian w sztuce i jej teoriach, mogłoby odegrać pojęcie „myślenia estetycznego”? Przedmiotem zainteresowania są punkty zwrotne w myśleniu, które można powiązać z doświadczeniami o charakterze transformacyjnym, dokonującymi się na gruncie filozofii i sztuki. Przedstawiono kilka możliwych kierunków takich analiz, odwołujących się do doświadczeń historycznych i transformacyjnych doświadczeń w myśleniu, spowodowanych przemianami cywilizacyjno-technologicznymi. Przywołane zostały przykłady transformującego oddziaływania podobnych doświadczeń na teorię i sztukę.

**Słowa kluczowe:** myślenie estetyczne, myślenie filozoficzne, myślenie artystyczne, poznanie pojęciowe, kreacja, sztuka, doświadczenie estetyczne, doświadczenie transformacyjne, sytuacje graniczne, bezpośredniość poznania, sensualność.

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