

JACEK GADECKI 
AGH University of Science and Technology
ŁUKASZ AFELTOWICZ 
AGH University of Science and Technology
ILONA MORAWSKA 
Institute of Urban and Regional Development
KAROLINA ANIELSKA 
Jagiellonian University in Kraków

FROM CULTURALLY-LED DEVELOPMENT TO A MEGA-PROJECT. AN EXTENDED CASE STUDY OF THE NEW CENTRE OF ŁÓDŹ

Abstract

The aim of the text is to show the specifics of the New Centre of Łódź (NCL) regeneration mega-project, which was inspired by the example of Bilbao. We will demonstrate how the transition from the Bilbao/Guggenheim effect in the original meaning (i.e., Bilbao 1, an investment in culture to propel a city's economic prosperity) to the Bilbao effect in the meaning of a pure mega-project (Bilbao 2) was accomplished. This shift has serious consequences for residents. Mega-projects most often serve only a narrow group of beneficiaries while their cost is borne by the community as a whole. If we stick to the

Jacek Gądecki, dr hab., Faculty of Humanities, ul. Cieszyńska 2, 30-015 Kraków, Poland; e-mail: jgadecki@agh.edu.pl; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1954-9605>

Łukasz Afeltowicz, dr hab., Faculty of Humanities, ul. Gramatyka 8a, 30-071 Kraków, Poland; e-mail: afeltowicz@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2316-6332>

Ilona Morawska, mgr inż., Institute of Urban and Regional Development, ul. Cieszyńska 2, 30-015 Kraków, Poland; e-mail: imorawska@irmir.pl; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2383-9568>

Karolina Anielska, mgr, Faculty of Geography and Geology, Institute of Geography and Spatial Management, ul. Gronostajowa 7, 30-387 Kraków, Poland; <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4697-7135>

Bilbao 1 model, there is a chance for the social development of the city, while Bilbao 2 mainly means super-gentrification. In the first model, culture may play an important function in urban development; in the second, it serves more to divert attention or legitimise mega-project investments. In many cases, the presence of well-known architects and the location of special functions have justified variations in the planning procedures and the concentration of enormous public investments that have provided feasible conditions for commercial and housing markets. We utilise the extended case study method, combining data from intensive ethnography, in-depth interviews, and the analysis of urban planning documents. Although NCL is typical in some respects, there are aspects that do not accompany other mega-projects known from the literature. This applies, above all, to the particular management model employed.

Keywords: mega-project, urban catalyst, flagship project, regeneration, gentrification, Bilbao/Guggenheim effect, spatial planning

INTRODUCTION

The mega-project concept plays an important role in the literature on urban regeneration and revitalisation [Orueta, Diaz, Fainstein 2008; Mpungose, Aubrey, Maharaj 2021]. A mega-project is a particular type of urban development project (UDP) [Moulaert et al. 2002]. The term mega-project itself refers not only to the large scale of an investment, but also to the particular management model used. Typical mega-projects are based on the public-private partnership model and are accompanied by low participation of residents in the decision-making processes. Political and financial elites most often benefit from the investment, although the costs are borne by local communities. It is quite typical that many mega-projects are promoted by the slogans of socio-cultural renewal, which is accompanied by an emphasis on the role of new cultural institutions created within municipal investments. The open question is whether new cultural institutions act as actual urban catalysts for change or whether they are distractors, diverting attention from the neo-liberal model of change.

The ambivalent role played by investments in cultural infrastructure is well illustrated by the case of Bilbao's renewal in the 90s. Two discursive repertoires on the subject of Bilbao's renewal can be identified. The first narrative (Bilbao type 1) attributes the renewal to the construction of the Guggenheim Museum. The history of Bilbao is for many a success story in which a new cultural institution has

attracted hundreds of thousands of tourists and made it possible to revive a run-down, post-industrial city not only in economic, but also in social and cultural terms. In this context, the terms “the Bilbao effect” and “the Guggenheim effect” were coined. There is, however, a competing narrative (Bilbao type 2), according to which the museum was only an element of a much larger UDP. It was not an easy fix and single intervention, but a long-lasting modernisation that included many other architectural changes, some of which preceded the construction of the museum. According to the Bilbao type 2 narrative, this particular UDP did not translate into the social revitalisation of the city. The local community suffered damage as a result of gentrification; artists were unable to afford to live and work in the new, gentrified Bilbao [Vicario, Martinez Monje 2003].

It is debatable what the Bilbao/Guggenheim effect actually is, whether it actually took place in Bilbao itself, or whether other cities can repeat Bilbao’s alleged success. Nonetheless, the success story and the Bilbao/Guggenheim concept influenced decision-makers across the world and were used to promote specific types of UDPs. One can treat the Bilbao/Guggenheim effect as a buzzword. From a sociological perspective, however, it is best to treat the Bilbao/Guggenheim effect in terms of defining a situation [Thomas 1928]. The definition may be false, but if adopted by many actors, it produces real effects, and thus it works. The success story of the Basque city fuelled a worldwide pursuit for Bilbao. At the same time, thanks to this history, the concept of cultural institutions as catalysts and the concept of a mega-project have been intertwined.

One of the large UDPs whose creators heavily referred to and used Bilbao type 1 narrative is the New Centre of Łódź (Nowe Centrum Łodzi, NCL). NCL is an ongoing regeneration. The new district will cover a post-industrial area of 100 ha located in the centre of Łódź in Central Poland. A few spectacular cultural buildings were to be created here, and Frank Gehry’s studio (which designed the museum in Bilbao) was involved in the project at the early stage. Gehry himself, as a starchitect, was also used to initiate and promote the UDP. The construction of new cultural institutions was to be accompanied by a comprehensive regeneration of a significant area of the city centre with the creation of a number of buildings and new communication nodes from scratch.

Today, NCL is a typical mega-project. However, the key point is that the original NCL was not intended to be governed by a neoliberal model. It was a project that began in the spirit of change through culture. However, along with the subsequent organisational and political perturbations, the project gradually turned into a mega-project. Initially, NCL was created in accordance with the Bilbao type 1 narrative, but ultimately, it embraced the Bilbao type 2 model.

This text is an extended NCL case study. Using various sources of data, we follow a gradual transformation of the logic of the project's implementation from the model of "renewal through culture" to a mega-project that treats the institution of culture as mainly a means of distraction from a political agenda. We show parallel changes in the management model, build environment, and the -urban concept itself. We compare NCL with other mega-projects known from the literature [Orueta, Diaz, Fainstein 2008; Fainstein 2008]. Considering the uniqueness of this project, we propose a theoretical distinction between mega-projects by design and mega-projects by drift. Our analysis is based on desk research (including analysis of GIS – Global Information System data), interviews with managers and stakeholders, and field observations.

The paper is divided into six parts. In the first part, we refer to the existing literature on mega-projects and cultural urban catalysts. We draw attention to Bilbao, where a mega-project and renewal through culture were interconnected within the narrative on the regeneration of urban areas. Data and methods are discussed in the second part of the text. In parts three to five, we present the results of our research. The third part is a detailed reconstruction of the history of NCL. Its considerable volume is justified by the fact that NCL is a tangle of several open, outlined, ongoing, closed, and "resurrected" projects. This complexity itself is an important context in understanding NCL. Understanding its history requires understanding the history of Bilbao's regeneration, which was a reference point for the project initiators. That is why we consider the stories of the Łódź undertaking against the background of the history of Bilbao, pointing to numerous similarities. In the fourth part, we confront the original concept of NCL with the investments thus far implemented and the most current plans. We show how NCL's concept and plan have drifted. In particular, we indicate moments when commercial elements were exposed at the expense of social and cultural ones. These changes become understandable in the context of the adopted project management model, which is discussed in part five. We show how the management logic evolved from enthusiastic attempts to build 'a homegrown Bilbao' to the so-called 'rescue operation'. Part six is a discussion. We place the case in a broader theoretical context, referring to other attempts to stimulate cities through spectacular cultural infrastructure. Above all, we show what distinguishes NCL. The text ends with conclusions.

THEORY: MEGA-PROJECTS, FLAGSHIP PROJECTS, AND URBAN CATALYSTS

From the perspective of our text, three analytical categories play a key role: mega-project, cultural flagship projects, and cultural urban catalyst. All three concepts were often invoked in the context of urban renewal processes, in particular in post-industrial and brownfield area regeneration [Deng, Poon 2014]. This also applies to the regeneration of cities in Poland [Sobala-Gwosdz, Gwosdz 2017]. These concepts are not synonymous; they apply to various aspects of regeneration projects.

As mentioned in the introduction, a mega-project is a category that relates not so much to a certain type of developmental project as to a specific model of planning and implementing large projects. Mega-projects are not only about spatial planning and urban regeneration. They include large technological (aerospace and energy projects) or infrastructural projects (for example, highways, stadiums, industrial plants, power plants, and dams). Mega-project logic is a product of international developmental policy that concentrated on large-scale physical infrastructure as a tool for social and economic development [Mayntz, Hughes 2019; Joerges 2019]. The logic of renewal through infrastructure was promoted after World War II by NATO, but also by the World Bank.

By itself, the concept of a mega-project is not related to culture. There is an emphasis on large investments, complex plans, and top-down, centralised management, which often involve the use of advanced technologies. In the context of urban changes, the selected UDPs that implement the smart-city concept are a variation on mega-projects. It especially refers to those that emphasise IT innovations and marginalise the importance of grassroots initiatives of citizens and social innovations [Gądecki 2018]. Another version of urban mega-projects will be UDPs that assign a special role to cultural institutions. Bilbao is such a model example of an urban mega-project that reveals the role of culture. According to the general narrative, the Guggenheim Museum, designed by Frank Gehry, was to play a key role in the renewal of the city.

Bilbao's renewal does not differ much from regeneration projects carried out previously in cities such as Baltimore, Frankfurt, Pittsburgh, Glasgow, or Barcelona [Vicario, Martinez Monje 2003]. The difference between Bilbao's design and that of the other cities mainly boils down to how the design was presented. The special role assigned to the Guggenheim Museum and the concept of the Bilbao/Guggenheim effect itself have been attractive to many decision-makers. The vision according to which the city can be renewed as a result of a single architectural

change is much more attractive than the one that emphasises thought-out regeneration projects spread over the years, considering the interests of many stakeholders.

The belief that investments in cultural infrastructure will “magically” improve the economic condition of a given city is not a new concept. The idea that cultural development triggers economic development had already existed before the renewal of Bilbao. One example is the cultural building boom of 1998–2001 (almost parallel to the regeneration of Bilbao) in the USA [Woronkowicz et al., 2012; Woronkowicz et al. 2014]. The regeneration of Bilbao in the 1990s did not trigger this trend. However, the success of the Guggenheim Museum was presented by many experts as proof that the construction of a new, spectacular cultural institution can stimulate a city economically and socially. An increase in the number of tourists and lower unemployment rates were measurable effects of establishing this institution. The investment in cultural infrastructure was returned to the city in the form of tax revenues within three years of the museum’s opening [Crawford 2001, cf. Plaza 2006]. The phenomenon by which investment in spectacular cultural infrastructure translates into an economic uplift of the city began to be identified as the Guggenheim effect or the Bilbao effect [Audretsch 2015: 99-102; Attoe, Longa 1989; Gordach 2008; Plaza 2006; Plaza, Tironi, Haarich 2009; Vicario, Martinez Monje 2003].

This Bilbao/Guggenheim effect raised, and still raises, doubts [also by Gehry himself see: Moore 2017]. Many researchers and commentators wonder what the mechanisms behind it are. One of the most striking questions is whether most of the merits should really be linked to a single investment or a broader modernisation of the city, including the important first phase of regeneration in 1991 (Bilbao Metropoli 30). The museum was not the only new facility built at that time in Bilbao [Gonzalez 2006]. The use of the term “effect” is questioned, as it suggests the repeatability of the phenomenon (as in the case of biological, physical, etc. effects). Many commentators treat the success of Bilbao as an anomaly [Rybczynski 2018]. What is more, many wonder whether, and for whom, the regeneration was actually beneficial. The economic benefits have been concentrated in the hands of the elite. The existing inhabitants did, to some extent, benefit from property value increases, but the city began losing the power to attract and retain the middle class and the creative class. The authorities were forced to raise the profile of Bilbao and to take action to preserve its creative power, through scholarships and creating creative quarters. Despite the doubts, policymakers around the world have tried to replicate Bilbao’s success. Countless city centres around the world have attempted to stimulate urban development through investment in cultural architecture [Crawford 2007].

There are at least two concepts that try to explain how a new cultural institution can stimulate the development of a city and its community. The first is urban catalyst [Attoe, Logan 1989; see also: Nematikutenae, Salami 2018]. According to this concept, cultural facilities can stimulate the development of the city by performing catalytic functions. The catalytic function provides an essential feature of urban infrastructure: the power needed to spark other activities. They emphasise the interaction of new and existing elements and the impact of new infrastructure on the future shape of the urban form. Stunning architecture is assigned a special role here. A spectacular landmark building can function as a catalyst of urban reconstruction. The original concept focused mainly on the architectural and material features of the built environment. Moulaert, Rodriguez, and Swyngedouw [Moulaert et al. 2002] elaborated and extended it. They focus not on single buildings but on larger projects. They state that UDPs can be catalysts not only of urban functions and diversity, but also of urban and political change. The second concept is the cultural flagship project [Grodach 2008, 2010; Heidenreich, Plaza 2015; Loftman, Nevin 1995; Smith, von Krogh Strand 2011; Smyth 2005, Temelová 2007; Zenker, Beckmann 2013]. Flagships provide visual evidence of urban renewal, sending a message not only to residents but also to visitors. Thus, they can be a tool for building city (new) identity. The expensive architecture itself sets a signal of the city's ongoing prosperity. The project can communicate the heritage and history of the city or its artistic ambitions.

The flagships concept, like the Bilbao/Guggenheim effect with which it was often associated, has its supporters and critics. The critics focus not only on the unfair distribution of the costs and benefits of flagships in the local community, but also on the questionable effectiveness of flagships as a tool to drive change [Voase 1997; Smyth 2005]. Grodach criticises the vision that buildings by themselves could attract customers and tourists. It points to many contextual factors on which the success of the flagship depends [Grodach 2008, 2010].

Flagships and catalysts are complementary concepts. The former focuses on the symbolism and communication with tourists and stakeholders through the building, and the latter on the influence of its architecture on the urban form and activity of its inhabitants. On the other hand, the concept of the Bilbao/Guggenheim effect is a concept connecting catalytic functions and flagships with urban regeneration projects and the cultural economy. Due to the Bilbao type 1 narrative, cultural elements of the build environment began to be highlighted in UDPs as elements of special importance. However, it should be remembered that neither the Guggenheim Museum nor any other flagships work by themselves, outside of the institutional and urban context.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We use the extended case study method approach (ECM) [Burawoy 1998], which combines positive and reflective methods, iteration of the analysis process and research reflectivity, and emphasis on embedding research field experiences in the theory. ECM is an alternative to typical comparative studies. Instead of a simple comparison, a deeper study of the case is made, and then it is presented within the context of the other known cases. Burawoy points out that “the extended case method applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ and to connect to the future, all by building on pre-existing theory” [Burawoy 1998: 16]. For the purposes of this text, the ethnography is defined in a similar way to Lees, from the perspective of the methods we used, i.e., participant observation and in-depth interviews, but, like Burawoy, we also want to focus on science, which is generally defined as “falsifiable and generalizable explanations of empirical phenomena” [Burawoy 1998: 6]. It raises fundamental questions regarding, in our case, the reliability, replicability, and representativeness of our research.

Applying the ECM approach, we try not only to present the methodological background of our research, but also to pay attention to the theoretical contribution that brings together post-positivist science and the case study method. When writing about NCL as an extended case, we have two issues in mind. First, extending observations over space and time: the text does not refer to long-term studies, but multiple, short-term, intensive field studies. Field research is, as Burawoy points out, a series of “experiments”. They last until the theory finally synchronizes with the studied world. It is a gradual approach, which, of course, may fail. The second meaning of ‘extension’ is about extending the theory [cf. Burawoy 1998: 21]. The extended case study focuses on the search for deviations from current theoretical models. The extended case study allows us to look at Łódź both as a model mega-project and as a unique phenomenon.

Our research results are threefold. Each type of result was achieved with different methods. First of all, we reconstructed the history of NCL using publicly available information, mainly newspapers (desk research). Second, we performed a comparative analysis of various NCL concepts and maps from various periods of mega-project implementation (geographical analysis and ethnographic observations). Third, we attempted to reconstruct the perspective and *modus operandi* of NCL’s managers (in-depth interviews, IDI’s). These three ways of describing NCL show various aspects of the urban transformation process.

The first part of our research was carried out shortly after EC1¹ opened in 2016. Then, we conducted field trips. The field research included repeatable, one- or two-day visits and non-participatory observations carried out by a two-person team (3 visits in total). The observations took place with the permission of the institution's authorities and covered both the experience of a typical user – a visitor – as well as subsequent visits behind the scenes of the institution, accompanied by its staff. Among other things, we made maps tracking typical user routes, analysing the time spent on the premises of the institution. In EC1, we visited the hall space and planetarium, which was the main attraction at this stage of the institution's functioning. During the second visit, we also visited the Science and Technology Centre, located in the EC1 West building, which was still at the stage of equipping and preparing the exhibition. Due to the nature of EC1, we also visited the surroundings, including the construction of the railway station, and the revitalised quarters of tenements, documenting the changes with our cameras. We also visited complementary or competing institutions to EC1, as indicated by our respondents, including Widzewska Manufaktura (WIMA) and the Se-Ma-For Animation Museum.

As part of the research, we also conducted IDIs with the institution's managers, employees, and people involved in the project on behalf of the city hall. The purpose of these interviews was to reconstruct the project's past, indicate a vision of its development, and ascertain the current realities of how it functions. The ten in-depth interviews were supplemented by short interviews with tourists visiting EC1 and people living or working in the vicinity of the investment².

After the field research phase, the next stage of the research involved reconstructing the history of the NCL project. The reconstruction of NCL's history was based on open data, mainly analysis of the press discourse, i.e., articles from the local press and websites. We also used materials from foundations and other entities involved in the project at its various stages. Plans also remained an important research material. The course of NCL's implementation, including the differences between the original plans and the current state, was analysed based on the field study and official documents. We applied the approach of comparative urban analysis, which was mainly based on a compilation of the original master

¹ EC1 (Elektrociepłownia 1) is a former combined heat and power station that is today the Centre for Science and Technology.

² The authors are grateful for the opportunity to use some of the findings of the research project entitled, *Bilbao Effect or Cargo Cult?* carried out under the supervision of Krzysztof Olechnicki, as part of the Observatory of Culture 2016 program. The results of that study were presented in Afeltowicz et al. [2018] and Afeltowicz et. al. [2021].

plan for NCL, by Rob Krier, with a new master plan prepared by the consulting company Deloitte, and subsequent modifications. We illustrate the changes that took place both in space and in the concepts of land development. The analysis was prepared in the ArcGIS program based on the available documents and official visualisations and materials of the city office, designers who were directly involved, and investors. A choropleth, which shows changes in property values (of both dwellings and business premises) in the city, was created using data acquired from Łódź Geodesy Centre.


NCL REGENERATION AND ŁÓDŹ AS A POLISH BILBAO

NCL was an attempt to replicate the Bilbao effect, and the promoters of the project explicitly referred to the Basque example. A building designed by the same studio was to be built in NCL, the management model was to be similar, and the similarities between both cities were pointed out. Łódź brings to mind the pre-Guggenheim Bilbao: the city has unique qualities, such as its social base, relatively cheap land, and significant cultural potential (with a prestigious, internationally recognized film school). It is also a post-industrial city. Łódź was transformed in the second half of the nineteenth century from a small village into a city with 500,000 inhabitants (Figure 1). The 1990s brought changes to the socio-economic system, the liquidation of socialist industry, and the fall of the city. Even the implementation model of NCL resembles that used for the regeneration of Bilbao: it is, without a doubt, a mega-project.

Despite the similarities, Łódź cannot be considered a natural urban laboratory in which one could try to repeat the success of Bilbao. Poland, unlike Spain, is not a tourist destination. It is more a post-transformational country with a still-low culture of investment management and spatial planning and a poorly developed civil society.

The fate of NCL is very tangled: over a decade or so, there were numerous initiatives and actors, many of whom disappeared from the scene as quickly as they appeared. For simplicity, we discuss the stories of selected initiatives and important figures that were used as resources in building the vision of the future of Łódź, and we present a graphic showing the interweaving and intertwining of various dimensions: urban, institutional, and architectural.


FIGURE 1. Location of Łódź and NCL



Source: own work based on <https://dane.gov.pl/> and <http://www.globalmapper.com.pl/>

The World Art Foundation (WAF) was established in January 2006 by three figures important to NCL: (1) Marek Żydowicz (cultural promoter, Camerimage Festival organizer, cultural entrepreneur), (2) David Lynch (American film director), and (3) Andrzej Walczak (co-owner and one of the presidents of the Atlas Group, patron of culture and art). Its aim was to open a facility in Łódź under the name of WAF). It is difficult today to determine to which of the planned structures discussed in this text the name of the foundation refers. Perhaps it was supposed to be the name of the area in which the buildings were to be created. It is possible the name referred to various objects throughout its lifetime, depending on the time and the need. The area was called the Special Art Zone (SAZ). There were to be further described cultural objects and public spaces.

FIGURE 2. The timeline of the NCL mega-project



Source: own work.

WAF initiated the process of regenerating NCL. It achieved this thanks to the combination of several sources of capital: financial (contributed by Walczak), social and political (brought by Żydowicz) and the use of symbolic resources: an ambitious vision of the future, a revitalized Łódź, a cultural centre, etc. Here are some of the symbolic resources used by the WAF:

(1) the figure of David Lynch and the social capital that the film director was supposed to bring was important. He was presented as someone able to stimulate the environment of filmmakers and to attract investment to the city. Lynch would deal not only with the production and direction of films using Łódź resources, but also supervise the post-production sound studio intended to be created in the revitalized EC1 East building.

(2) the figure of Rob Krier, a renowned Luxembourgian architect and urbanist. In January 2007, WAF invited him to Łódź, and then ordered the NCL concept, which was handed over to the city as a donation. Cooperation with Krier officially ended in December 2008. Ultimately, the urbanist disassociated himself from how the city and various actors used his original vision.

(3) the figure of Frank Gehry himself. He appeared at the invitation of WAF in Łódź in February 2008. He was supposed to create a project of the Łódź festival headquarters: Camerimage Łódź Centre (CLC).

In July 2009, a company was established to realize CLC, and Gehry was asked to prepare the early concept. The concept was presented in December 2009, during a great gala with the architect himself in attendance. However, as early as the next month (January 2010), the city authorities cancelled the co-financing of CLC. It coincided with the impeachment (a political referendum on January 17, 2010)

of the President of Łódź, Jerzy Kropiwnicki, a supporter of the WAF initiative. In December 2011, city councillors passed a resolution to dissolve CŁC.

In addition to the revitalized EC1 and the planned CLC, WAF initiated the creation of another institution and facility: The Special Art Zone (SAZ). SAZ had already been included by Krier in his master plan; however, this objective was not implemented either. The design studio was selected through a competition in July 2008, and two years later, a partnership agreement was signed. The proposed concept (SAZ as a large glass pipe) had nothing to do with Krier's vision. In May 2010, a construction permit for SAZ was granted, but in July, a dispute over the copyright for the project began: the architecture office demanded additional funds from the city. In November, a reminder was issued to the architectural office, which remained unanswered. The project was abandoned.

The dissolution of CŁC and the abandonment of the SAZ project coincided with the departure of Walczak from WAF. In July 2010, he sued WAF. This was also the beginning of renovation work at EC1 East. At the same time, the city attempted to regain control over EC1, which was previously entrusted to WAF. In July 2012, the court ruled that the city could buy the building from WAF for a symbolic amount, for which the foundation sold it.

It is difficult to determine at which exact moment and why the relationship between Lynch and WAF collapsed. Eventually, WAF disappeared from the stage in May 2013.

In May 2011, a new team of decision-makers and managers attempted to save the project. The first step was a visit of the new president of Łódź, Hanna Zdanowska, to Gehry's design studio in the US. The details of the talk are unknown, but there was no consensus. In July 2011, Zdanowska, together with Walczak and Błażej Moder (the future president of NCL), went to visit another architect, Daniel Libeskind. He was to design the City Gate – the building encapsulating the concept of NCL.

At the same time, in May 2011, work began on reconstructing the Łódź Fabryczna Train Station (Polish State Railways chose an executive consortium), which in Krier's concept would perform the transit function of NCL. Demolition of the old station took place in May 2012, and the new station was opened only in December 2016. The construction of the rail tunnel began in March 2019. The station's potential is currently unrealized, and it may never be. The building is too big for Łódź's transportation needs.

Our research focused on the EC1 complex, which consists of three buildings: EC1 East, EC1 South-East, and EC1 West. The complex is a regenerated heat and power plant, and it has a special role in the history of the NCL. It was

around the idea of regenerating the heat and power plant that the concept of the SAZ and the more general concept of NCL developed. This building was not particularly featured in the publicity: it was outshone by other, more spectacular planned structures. EC1 East was supposed to house WAF's office and Lynch's studio. However, ultimately, EC1 is the only one of the originally planned culture institutions to be built in NCL.

The EC1 East building's function deviates from the one planned. It was conceived as a limited access space; only the spacious hall would be accessible to the public. When the city regained EC1 East, the plan was considered non-functional: there was no market demand for the studio, as Camerimage had moved to another city. Because EU funds were used in the project, it was decided that it would undergo a re-qualification procedure. Formally, the redefinition has been a success. The European Commission accepted a complex proposal which assumed that EC1 East would become the headquarters of a newly established national cultural institution: The National Centre for Film Culture.

The functional program of the building has changed in a legal sense, as it was impossible to change the original architectural plans. The building is too big and is difficult to fill, even for the largest cultural events. In the large, high-rise hall that was supposed to be part of the sound production studio, there will most likely be an exhibition on the history of cinematography. The building is open to guests, but it is not exactly friendly: people find it difficult to orient themselves in the space of the building and most often quickly leave. Traces of the original concept have been preserved in, among others, a complicated system of staircases, elevators and corridors. The impression of inaccessibility is further intensified by restricting access to selected floors and sections of the building, including doors locked with electronic keys and elevators with access blocked to selected floors.

In August 2015, a new master plan for NCL was prepared by Deloitte, which still provided for the necessity to preserve the multi-functionality of the space. However, the focus shifted from cultural to commercial functions. The public spaces in NCL shrank and changed location. So far, apart from EC1, there are mainly office buildings in the NCL, including the headquarters of one of the largest consumer banks in Poland. Further buildings will be attached to already constructed commercial buildings.

FIGURE 3. Deloitte’s concept of NCL



Source: own work based on Master Plan NOWE CENTRUM ŁODZI vol. II – NCL Program Diagnosis”.

The authorities of Łódź still maintain the idea of creating a community-friendly space, but it has been moved outside NCL. In July 2016, work began on the Commune Regeneration Program. This time, the main theme is the Woonerf concept. Living streets are to be built in the areas surrounding NCL. They may be included in developers’ projects, but they are just declarations for now. Therefore, we have two logics working side by side: NCL is to be created by commercial investments, and the surroundings are to be regenerated in a mode that assumes the mobilisation and participation of the inhabitants.

THE PLANNING DRIFT

One can observe a discrete redefining of the space and moving away from different types of plans. Let us show how developers, decision-makers, and consultants have departed from the original idea.

Krier imagined NCL as a space filled with buildings with facades that resemble the surrounding tenements and that were similar in scale. The heat and power plant was to be simply restored. A square was to be built within NCL, its form referring to places like St. Peter's Square in Rome or Marktplatz in Poznan. In the area of NCL, there were to be passages covered with glass roofs (galleries), similar to those found in Paris, Milan or Brussels. The project was not only internally consistent, but it also blended with the surrounding buildings.

FIGURE 4. Krier's concept of NCL




Source: own work based on first Krier concept – 2007. At this link [<https://slideplayer.pl/slide/56543/>] there is a presentation and a part of Krier's original concept from 2007. The concept itself is not available to the public.

The heat and power plant was restored, but the facade of the EC1 East was fitted with a glass front with three towers, an obvious departure from Krier's vision. From the very beginning, he was an opponent of placing buildings by 'starchitects' like Libeskind or Gehry within NCL. However, WAF, and later the city authorities, tried to include these architects in the work on the NCL: instead of sticking to a coherent vision, which exposed the industrial heritage of the place, it was decided on fragmentary, point-based interventions, and the construction of individual buildings was entrusted to various design offices, emphasising modern aesthetics. If the cooperation were successful, NCL would be able to "show off" a few icon-buildings. This, however, failed, and the buildings that actually arose in NCL are office buildings with glass fronts, much higher than the buildings that Krier planned.

An element that has radically changed in relation to Krier's master plan is the structure called the City Gate. Originally, it was to be an entrance to the cultural quarter from the north-west, from the side of a nearby park. Krier imagined it as a gate that would be integrated with and connected to the rest of the buildings. Immediately behind the gate, a passage covered with glass was to open. The orientation of this building has changed: now the entrance to NCL is from the west. Libeskind's early project of the City Gate was presented in December 2013. At this stage, the building still resembled a gate, but it was a free-standing structure no longer integrated with the old buildings. The City Gate, after renewed tenders and changes of investors and concepts, is finally being created, but the Libeskind project was abandoned. The original idea of the gate is currently implemented by two separate office buildings built by Skanska, with an elevation made from corten steel. Apart from the name, The City Gate has nothing to do with the ideas of Krier or Libeskind. Certainly, it does not fulfil the function of a gate that leads to NCL as planned. Two separate buildings can symbolically be an entrance to a city or district, but only on condition that they visually dominate the rest of the buildings. In the area where they were erected, there will be more office buildings of similar height: The City Gate will not function as a landmark.

FIGURE 5. Existing components of NCL in 2005



Source: own work based on www.geoportal.gov.pl

The morphology of the space is interesting: street layout, the size and location of the squares, and the location, shape and height of buildings. The original concept assumed the dominance of pedestrian traffic and a richness of various public spaces, including various alleys and a large, centrally located square. To increase walkability, the station had to be hidden underground. It happened, but the way this structure is implemented is not conducive to pedestrian communication. The station, covered by a glass roof, can be associated with the passages from Krier's concept. Under the station's roof, there is room for commercial space and offices. The passages were to be a public space allowing efficient connections between various points in NCL. Moreover, the station has not been skilfully incorporated into the fabric of the district: it is an enclave surrounded by barriers and edges in the form of a network of multi-lane roads and tram tracks. Trying to walk the

NCL from north to south, pedestrians must take footbridges over concrete moats and look for pedestrian crossings. The station itself turned out to be a model non-place [Auge 2008]: it is too big for the city's needs and will probably always be empty, further increasing its airport-like aesthetics.

FIGURE 6. Existing and under construction components of NCL in 2019



Source: own work based on Esri, Digital Globe.

Krier's concept of land development referred in its style to solutions used in medieval cities. As the central area – the heart of NCL – it indicated a square to be called Rynek Kobro, located in the vicinity of EC1 East and Łódź Fabryczna train station. The square has not yet been built. It was not until 2015 that the authorities returned to the idea, but so far without results. Several tenders for designing this space have been announced, but none has been resolved. The square will probably be built, but it is not certain what it will look like. Accord-

ing to the latest concept, the northern part of the square is to cascade down to the lower floors of the station, at which level underground streets will run. In the central and southern part, it should be just a square, covered with red brick with integrated LEDs. These are only plans because so far, there has not been a contractor who will undertake the project within the budget specified by the city authorities. The only thing that is certain is that the surface of the square shrinks with every approach to planning NCL.

The authorities are trying to develop the NCL space by selling plots of land to investors. What is to be created on a given plot is generally left to developers. In fact, it is they who will determine the shape and functions of the emerging district. Developers announce that mixed-use facilities will be created on their plots, and some will blend in with the woonerfs recently being promoted in Łódź. However, these are only declarations. Deloitte's master plan mixes functionalities, but unlike urban zoning plans, it has no legal force. It is just a concept, as was Krier's master plan.

Considering the carelessness with which master plans are approached and the problems with finding investors or contractors, it should be assumed that the NCL project will continue to drift, and further elements will be attached to existing ones along the way, resulting in the creation of an urban patchwork. It can also be assumed that, gradually, commercial functions – shops and offices – will dominate NCL's fabric. An example of smuggling in this type of function is the plan to build a shopping mall complex over the station after it has served its purpose. We do not know if the extension will be created, but – as our interviews show – the foundations were prepared for such an eventuality.

THE 'RESCUE OPERATION' MODE

NCL witnessed political turmoil, actors appearing on and disappearing from the stage, numerous abandoned projects, and wasted funds. However, in the face of these circumstances, the city did not decide to abandon the project. Managers appeared on the scene and were entrusted with carrying out an extensive investment rescue operation: efforts were made to save the plans as much as possible in the architectural and symbolic sense.

Our respondents – managers themselves – defined the logic of their actions as a “rescue operation” or “extinguishing a fire”. And this type of approach can explain the fate of the City Gate. After they gave up on the idea of constructing CLC, the City Gate was supposed to take over the function of an icon, with its

look being presented in visualisations and sketches. Designers and investors were sought for a very long time.

In the course of the interviews, we determined that the managers perceive their task mainly in terms of organising the consequences of conflicts around WAF and securing investment from the financial side. Functional issues, including those related to culture, from which everything began, remained in the background and only recently began to play a more important role in their activities. As one of the managers put it: “EC1 is a cultural institution by name, since 2008. However, from the perspective of launching cultural activities, it has been a cultural institution for only a year. Therefore, a decision was made in 2008 to establish a new institution with a private partner and to entrust this institution with the process of regenerating the complex, a very complex, very difficult investment process worth about PLN 200 million, with EU funding from PLN 80 million. As one of the managers admitted, “The institution was cultural only in name, but in fact, it was a new investment unit. When I came to work here, half of my team were former construction engineers. There were two out of fifty employees involved in substantive cultural activities” [code: IDI_2]. In other words, the rescue mission focused on saving the project, and only then on ensuring its coherence, taking care of meeting the specific needs of future tenants. The area was to be somehow regenerated; investors were to be found, but it was less about what regeneration would bring than what investors would put there. Developers, to whom management tries to sell as large plots as possible, ensure cohesion and possible multi-functionality.

Exactly the same thing happened, only on a smaller scale, with EC1 East. The rescue operation model was also applied there. Both rescue operations are closely related, as evidenced by the fact that since January 2015, the director of the NCL management board and the director of EC1 Łódź are the same person. EC1 East itself has also become the headquarters of the NCL management board.

The change of the functional plan of the building was to protect the city from returning the EU subsidy. The operation was successful in a formal sense. However, when considering architecture and proxemics, the building is not at all suited to the new mission. Bottlenecks cannot be removed, and it is impossible to simplify the tangle of rooms and corridors. The main building’s problem is its size: such a huge space is difficult to fill. Even during large commercial events, it seems to be empty. The décor of the huge EC1 hall, which is dominated by features common to airports (moving stairs and signs reminiscent of airport signs), make many visitors feel uncomfortable in this space. This is another example of a non-place: a kind of airport space that can handle even very large groups of guests but does not make them want to stay long.

The scale of EC1 scale means that its staff is preoccupied with statistics and filling the space with enough guests. There is no ambition to educate citizens or to provide cultural experiences. From the perspective of the city authorities, EC1 has a privileged position in relation to the other cultural institutions that function in the city. In practice, this means redirecting a significant portion of municipal subsidies for cultural activities to EC1. It is also expected that existing initiatives and institutions in the city will somehow be linked to EC1.

Establishing such links between EC1 and other cultural entities was described by our interviewees as “hugging”. Taking into account the differences in resources and position, one should consider whether EC1 is “hugging” its partners or pinning them down. In summary, the logic of the rescue operation acts as an overriding principle: the cultural policy is subordinated throughout the city. EC1, as a cultural institution, comes to take over and control various types of resources, not only the money allocated to culture in the city of Łódź, but also the functions and resources that remained in the hands of other, smaller cultural institutions, such as the Film Museum of Łódź and the “Se-ma-for” Animation Museum.

One of the most important aspects of the described rescue mission is building and maintaining narratives about EC1 and NCL. It absorbs a significant part of the time of EC1 and NCL personnel, and it is about creating a vision and telling stories to relieve tensions, distract attention from past events, and focus on a bright future. We ourselves witnessed one such treatment in 2016: during a tour of EC1, we climbed with a group of visitors to the top of the building, from which there was a view of the unfinished Łódź Fabryczna Train Station and the surrounding area, just waiting for regeneration. The guide skillfully gave meaning to what everyone was looking at. NCL was presented not as a battlefield, a catalogue of cancelled projects and feuds, but as a new “promised land”. Our attention was focused on what was there a long time ago (the industrial past of Łódź, on the foundations of which we are building) and what will be there (the new centre), not on what is here and now. Different kinds of visualisations, presentations, and celebrated events serve this purpose.

The best example is the celebration of the opening of Łódź Fabryczna Train Station, which was abandoned again the next day. Many residents appeared at this event, and none of the audience or officials there was willing to raise difficult issues, for example, that the works were delayed, that the building was not completed, that it consumed much more funds than expected, or that a city of this size may not need such a big station.

An important aspect of maintaining NCL's vision as a success is breaking it down into stages. Individual elements of NCL are given at regular intervals, so that every six months or once a year, the management board can boast of another success. What was presented to the media usually ignored the fact that NCL was still a big construction site. Considering the number of abandoned projects, in the case of the NCL, the very investment itself is considered successful, even if the only thing it has in common with the original concept is its name, as in the case of the City Gate. The logic of the rescue action means that no one asks whether the funds allocated for NCL could be better utilized or whether NCL will perform its designed functions.

And here we come to the issue of the absence of citizens in the process of the regeneration of NCL. The logic of the rescue operation meant that the regeneration of the area turned into a typical mega-project similar to Bilbao. In mega-projects like this, a usually small group of specialists and members of the political and financial elite decide on all the important matters. The influence of the urban community on the shape of the mega-project is usually possible only in the advanced stage of the process, when important decisions have already been made. As one of the managers responsible for EC1 put it honestly, "As for the philosophy [of the project of EC1], there were mistakes: we are building an enclave of luxury in isolation from the whole city. We had chosen a special piece and made a 'bauble' there, but it is detached from the whole urban organism. Our mistakes have deep philosophical, communication, and engineering dimensions" [IDI 3].

The need to create a stable network of cooperation and coalitions between commercial entities and the public sector often leads to restrictions on public access to information on investment costs. When we extinguish fires, there is no time to engage citizens. It is significant that the creation of the second master plan was entrusted to Deloitte, and its social consultations were, to many commentators, staged. Putting plots at the disposal of the developers and assigning responsibility to them relieved the management of NCL of responsibility. Most importantly, it generated quick profits for the city, which was announced to citizens as a great success. Of course, NCL is not the only project to go into rescue mode. It is quite common in Polish urban planning. What is characteristic of rescue missions is that in the course of their implementation, the goal or mission that had previously guided it is lost. A common tactic is to declare success only because they managed to overcome the vagaries of fate and close one stage of work: it does not matter that what was created is not necessarily what was planned.


DISCUSSION

It is hard not to notice the irony of the fate affecting those who are trying to repeat the success story of Bilbao. Trying to renew an urban space in the sense of revitalising the social fabric of the city (the Bilbao 1 narrative), Łódź's real estate developers and decision-makers can actually lead to gentrification or supergentrification [Lees 2003b] led by new investment, replacing existing residents and creative individuals, weakening social bonds. In other words, it leads to the vision of Bilbao type 2 (consequences that actually resulted from changes in the urban development of Bilbao). Even though gentrification has many faces, apart from upgrading the built environment [Podagrosi et al. 2011], it always involves a change in the local population and its socio-economic status. The problem with fulfilled wishes lies in the fact that they often turn out not what was hoped for. As in Bilbao [Esteban 2000], the city authorities in Łódź focused almost exclusively on the physical regeneration and ignored its social and economic aspects.

Local government can play an important role in the gentrification of a city – this is what happened in Bilbao and might happen in Łódź. The creation of the Guggenheim Museum fast-forwarded gentrification in Bilbao to some of the later stages of the process, while skipping marginal or pioneer gentrification [Lorenzo, Martinez Monje 2003]. In the earlier stages and waves, the relationship between gentrification and arts mostly means an influx of artists into the area. In the advanced stages, this relationship becomes more complicated and is usually associated with the explosion of buildings such as museums, concert halls, etc. [Grodach et al. 2018].

In Łódź, we could observe mostly new-build gentrification led by real estate developers with the city authorities' permission – in some cases silent, in some, more direct. Real estate projects that follow the NCL development might create island-like gentrification areas [Malheiros et al. 2013] (with the NCL buildings being the original island), affecting not only the urban fabric but, more importantly, the social fabric. However, for cities in Central Europe, it is characteristic that different stages of gentrification can occur simultaneously, we cannot indicate clear gentrification waves [Gałdecki 2013; Jakóbczyk-Gryszkiewicz 2015], and gentrification can be accompanied by supergentrification [Anielska 2019].

FIGURE 7. Areas with a greater change in real estate transaction prices than the average change for the city in 2012-2017



Source: own work based on data acquired from Lodz Geodesy Center” (Łódzki Ośrodek Geodezji).

However, analysis of the real estate market in Łódź suggests that this scenario will not be played out. It is considerably difficult to find developers ready to invest in NCL, and this even though the developers enjoy considerable freedom of land management.

Plans and visions of NCL exist in a formal sense, but they turn out to be highly unstable. NCL as a concept is in constant flux: the visions of buildings change, new mock-ups are created, and designers come and go. However, NCL in the physical sense – the buildings, the squares, and the streets and tunnels already constructed – is no longer so changeable. While it is easy to lose the multi-functionality due to subsequent reinterpretations, it is difficult to implement

such a structure in a way that is not predicted at the planning stage. On a smaller scale, the tangible effect of this drift is the appearance of non-places, such as Łódź Fabryczna Train Station and EC1 East. Most probably, the whole space of NCL will become the antithesis of what Krier had proposed.

Let us not forget about the time scale. The implementation of the NCL project will drag on for many years due to political turmoil, delays in implementation, and problems with finding investors. This definitely distinguishes NCL from other mega-projects. In the case of a typical mega-project, the initiating factors are economic forces and substantial capital. NCL was born of the will of local actors, and thanks to the same forces, it was sustained. The transition to the mega-project mode took place with the change of power. When “extinguishing fires”, the technocratic and neoliberal scheme turns out to be the option of choice. Under such conditions, there is no time for the wide participation of diverse citizens. Instead, it is necessary to promote success and constantly redefine what NCL is or should have been. The confusion that obviously results makes it difficult to settle anything or anyone: few people remember what NCL was supposed to be.

A key question should be asked here: why was action to save the project taken at all? The NCL concept, which assumed the construction of several spectacular objects, was the fruit of a quite common error known as planning fallacy. It combines excessive optimism about the potential benefits, the readiness of other actors to cooperate, and underestimating the time and cost of the investment. When planning and preparing for an investment, which usually lasts for several years, social relations arise among the promoters of the project, and these hinder rational assessment of the situation and possible abandonment of the project. This was the case with many cultural institutions realized during the American building boom [Woronkiewicz et al. 2014], but not with NCL. After the former Lodz' president and its cabinet was removed from power, the new authorities had the opportunity to withdraw easily from the project, presenting NCL as a flawed project: a result of irrational decisions of the predecessors, wasteful allocation of public funds. The network of actors promoting the project lost control over it and disbanded soon after. The new decision-makers considered the plans to be unreasonable, which was expressed by initiating the EC1 reclassification procedures, abandoning surplus cultural buildings, and ordering a new master plan from Deloitte.

In spite of this, the NCL project was retained as a whole, and attempts were made (ultimately unsuccessful) to acquire another architect for the project. This involved the city's years-long commitment to an expensive project, redirecting funds for culture to EC1, and moving into a rescue operation mode.

Following the extended case study method, we compare NCL with other mega-projects. The similarities and differences are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1. Łódź as an extended case study: regularities and specifics of the NCL project

area/sphere	Patterns and general tendencies (according to Moulaert et al. 2002.)	NCL
Territorial fragmentation	Detachment	Discontinuity, NCL is encapsulated by building sites, office buildings, multi-lane roads
Accountability measures	Regional/national control, new structures (PPP) Private developer (Naples)	NCL is managed by representatives of municipal authorities; a lack of PPP; EC1 functions as a building plot sales agency; EU audits as external control
Neighbourhood functions	Multifunctional and gentrified space	NCL management strives to facilitate gentrification, but developers create unified space populated by office buildings; both the train station and EC1 function as non-places
Institutional complexity	Large variability between cases	Changing. Initially, a low complexity relationship between private organisations and municipal authorities, then the control was taken over by the new authorities, and there was a need to redesign the NCL. Finally, an attempt was made to reduce complexity by entrusting control to a team of managers (rescue operation). The numerous changes and a lack of transparency make the whole process seem extremely complex from the outside. The City council diverts resources from other cultural institutions to support EC1
Inclusion/participation	Usually limited or absent	Tokenism, exclusion of citizens from decision making, managerial approach, lack of transparency
Social returns	Usually limited or non-existent	Negative social returns

Source: Own study [inspired by Moulaert et al. 2002].

NCL displays many aspects of a typical mega-project: excluding citizens from the decision-making process, a neoliberal and technocratic approach, a focus on purely economic indicators as the only criteria for the success of regeneration, and treating cultural institutions only in terms of investment. But there are some unique circumstances that are worth paying attention to.

Hopes for the new investment were inflated, which is typical of mega-projects. In this case, however, it cannot be concluded whether the functions will or will not be fulfilled. The reason is the continuous drift of the design. During the rescue operation, crucial features of the original concept were gradually abandoned in

the name of achieving short-term goals. Small successes are achieved. In the press, the local authorities boast about the amounts for which new plots of land are sold to developers, new buildings are put into use, and various problems with the transport infrastructure are being solved. NCL gradually ceases to resemble a huge construction site, but there is no longer a general vision of what will be built, where, or what NCL will be.

The plan is drifting. It is crucial, however, that the drift is not random. It is biased. If the project is left unchecked, it will drift toward a more neoliberal mode of management. NCL managers rely on commercial entities, giving them maximum freedom of action. However, commercial entities are reluctant to use land in the NCL in a specific way dictated by the market. It is not a public-private partnership model, which is typical of this type of UDP. Often, the driving force behind mega-projects is the interests of commercial enterprises: here the project is carried by managers who are dependent on the city. This neoliberal model is quite unique, but fully in line with the culture of privatisation prevailing in Poland since the beginning of the socio-economic transition, which started in Poland at 1989.

NCL is also a mega-project that lacks leadership. Charismatic individuals and visionaries played a key role in initiating the NCL project, but they quickly vanished from the scene. The project has managers, but no leaders. This is important because the role of leaders is indicated as an important factor in the success of mega-projects [Audretsch 2015].

Many mega-projects try to use cultural institutions as a catalyst for urban changes and as a tourist attraction. However, what distinguishes NCL is that technically speaking, the staff of cultural institutions was entrusted with managing the mega-project. In the case of Łódź, the building of the cultural institution houses the NCL board office. Thus, we are dealing here with an extreme form of cultural instrumentalisation. Cultural activities and development project management are indistinguishable here. In fact, the managers' approach is in line with the extreme version of cultural economics.

CONCLUSIONS: A MEGA-PROJECT WITHOUT A PROJECT?

In this paper, we distinguished mega-project by design and mega-projects by drift. NCL is an example of the latter. Decision-makers, managers and planners created several generations of NCL sketches and plans, but these were regularly modified, depending on the need. The project management model also changed. The project was initiated as a vision based on the Bilbao type 1 narrative, and it was promoted by charismatic leaders. However, ultimately, NCL is more like

Bilbao type 2, and the project is managed in a highly technocratic manner, with no clear leadership. The very vision of Łódź as the second Bilbao faded away and was replaced with a generic model of gentrification. Even visually, NCL was becoming increasingly generic: the initial plans to exhibit Lodz's architecture were replaced by projects with an aesthetic detached from the history of this city.

In this text, we did not want to speculate as to whether the city of Łódź and its inhabitants would have benefited more if the original concept had been maintained and implemented. We also did not undertake an assessment of whether the concept changes were justified. We were only interested in the lack of a coherent framework of vision, roadmap, and success criteria. Master plans created at different times did not stabilise the vision of NCL. Currently, it is still difficult to say what NCL will look like when the construction works are completed. Such a vision will not be offered to us by project managers, as they are focused on solving current, local problems, and not on taking care of the logic of the space and the consistency of the functions of the created architectural objects. Residents are offered a variety of recycled architectural ideas and visualisations. Yes, a significant part of the architectural structures already exist. However, their final function and meaning depend on their immediate environment. For example, EC1 can perform a catalytic function if it is connected with the city and not cut off by communication or architecturally separated from it. In turn, whether this object will be able to function as a landmark or icon depends on what the surrounding buildings will look like, in particular, what their height will be.

At the moment, it cannot be said that the NCL is one coherent project. We are dealing here with coexisting, not entirely overlapping narratives about the potential of this place and its future functions. The end result is likely to resemble a patchwork of solutions and ideas rather than the result of coherent planning, space indexing, and the systematic implementation of ideas. Too many plans mean that NCL is a mega-project that is emerging in response to future opportunities and emerging limitations. It is a result of organisational and architectural bricolage, rather than design.

Acknowledgement: The paper is a result of the project “Innovation Districts? Creative Industries and Urban Changes” financed by the National Science Centre, Sonata BIS 6, number 2016/22/E/HS6/0144.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Afeltowicz, Łukasz, Krzysztof Olechnicki, Tomasz Szlendak, Michał Wróblewski, Jacek Gądecki. 2021. "How to make the white elephant work: Findings from ethnographic research into Polish new cultural institutions". *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 27(3): 377–393.
- Afeltowicz, Łukasz, Jacek Gądecki, Krzysztof Olechnicki, Tomasz Szlendak, Michał Wróblewski. 2018. *Efekt Bilbao/kult cargo: Nowe instytucje kultury w Polsce*. Elbląg: Elbląskie Towarzystwo Naukowe im. Jana Myliusa.
- Anielska Karolina. 2019. „Gentryfikacja, jak ją rozpoznać i zmierzyć przy użyciu dostępnych danych ilościowych”. *Studia Regionalne i Lokalne* 77: 83–102.
- Attoe Wayne, Dann Logan. 1989. *American urban architecture: Catalysts in the design of cities*. University of California Press.
- Audretsch David B. 2015. *Everything in its place: Entrepreneurship and the strategic management of cities, regions, and states*. Oxford University Press.
- Augé Marc. 2008. *Non-places: An introduction to supermodernity*. London and New York: Verso.
- Burawoy Michael. 1998. "The extended case method". *Sociological theory* 16(1): 4–33.
- Butler Tim, Loretta Lees. 2006. "Supergentrification in Barnsbury, London: Globalization and gentrifying global elites at the neighbourhood level". *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 31(4): 467–487.
- Crawford Leslie. 2001. "Guggenheim, Bilbao, and the 'hot banana'". *Financial Times* 4 September.
- Crawford Leslie. 2007. "The museum that saved a city". *Financial Times* 6 October.
- Deng Ying, S.W. Poon. 2014. "Positioning mega-event flagships—from performing arts center of expo 2010 to Mercedes-Benz Arena". *Architectural Engineering and Design Management* 10 (3–4): 233–250.
- Fainstein Susan S. 2008. "Mega-projects in New York, London and Amsterdam". *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 32(4): 768–785.
- Lees Loretta. 2003a. "Urban geography: 'New' urban geography and the ethnographic void". *Progress in Human Geography* 27(1): 107–113.
- Lees Loretta. 2003b. "Super-gentrification: The case of Brooklyn Heights, New York City". *Urban Studies* 40(12): 2487–2509.
- Clark Eric. 2005. The order and simplicity of gentrification political challenge. In: *Gentrification in a global context: The new urban colonialism*, R. Atkinson, G. Bridge (eds.), 261–269. London: Routledge.
- Esteban Marisol. 2000. *Bilbao, luces y sombras del titanio. El proceso de regeneración urbana del Bilbao metropolitano*. Bilbao: Servicio Editorial Universidad del País Vasco.
- Gądecki Jacek. 2013. „Odkrywając miasto idealne? Marginalna gentryfikacja starej części dzielnicy Nowa Huta.” *Studia Regionalne i Lokalne*. 54(4): 64–81.
- Gądecki Jacek. 2018. „Od zawężenia do rozszerzenia wspólnoty: Od współdzielenia do wykluczenia: Koncepcja inteligentnego miasta a ważne wyzwania dla wspólnoty miejskiej”. *Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica* 19(1): 136–146.

- González Sara.** 2006. “Scalar narratives in Bilbao: A cultural politics of scales approach to the study of urban policy”. *International journal of urban and regional research* 30(4): 836–857.
- Grodach Carl.** 2008. “Museums as urban catalysts: The role of urban design in flagship cultural development”. *Journal of Urban Design* 13(2): 195–212.
- Grodach Carl.** 2010. “Beyond Bilbao: Rethinking flagship cultural development and planning in three California cities”. *Journal of planning education and research* 29(3): 353–366.
- Grodach Carl, Nicole Foster, James Murdoch.** 2018. “Gentrification, displacement and the arts: Untangling the relationship between arts industries and place change”. *Urban Studies* 55(4): 807–825.
- Heidenreich Martin, Beatriz Plaza.** 2015. “Renewal through culture? The role of museums in the renewal of industrial regions in Europe”. *European Planning Studies* 23 (8): 1441–1455.
- Jakóbczyk-Gryszkiewicz Jolanta.** (eds.) 2015. *Procesy gentryfikacji w obszarach śródmiejskich wielkich miast na przykładzie Warszawy, Łodzi i Gdańska*. Warszawa: Komitet Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju PAN.
- Joerges Bernward.** 2019. *Large technical systems: Concepts and issues*. London: Routledge.
- Loftman Patrick, Brendan Nevin.** 1995. “Prestige projects and urban regeneration in the 1980s and 1990s: A review of benefits and limitations”. *Planning Practice & Research* 10 (3–4): 299–316.
- Malheiros Jorge, Rui Carvalho, Luís Mendes.** 2013. “Gentrification, residential ethnicization and the social production of fragmented space in two multi-ethnic neighbourhoods of Lisbon and Bilbao”. *Finisterra* XLVIII 96: 109–135.
- Mayntz Renate, Thomas Hughes.** 2019. *The development of large technical systems*. London: Routledge.
- Moore Rowan.** 2017. The Bilbao effect: How Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim started a global craze. *The Guardian*, 1 October, <https://www.theguardian.com/artand-design/2017/oct/01/bilbao-effect-frank-gehry-guggenheim-global-craze> [access: 01.06.2021].
- Mpungose Aubrey, Brij Maharaj.** 2021. “Megaprojects in the context of neoliberalism: Socio-economic and spatial impacts of the proposed dig-out port in Durban, South Africa”. *Urban Forum. Springer Netherlands*: 1–23.
- Nematikutenaee Nahid Farzaneh Salami, Farideh Asadian.** 2018. “Urban catalyst: Concepts and requirements”. *Geography* 15(55): 0–0.
- Orueta Fernando Diaz, Susan S. Fainstein.** 2008. “The new mega-projects: Genesis and impacts”. *International journal of urban and regional research* 32(4): 759–767.
- Smith Andrew, Ingvild von Krogh Strand.** 2011. “Oslo’s new Opera House: Cultural flagship, regeneration tool or destination icon?”. *European Urban and Regional Studies* 18(1): 93–110.

- Smyth Hedley.** 2005. *Marketing the city: The role of flagship developments in urban regeneration*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Swyngedouw Erik, Frank Moulaert, Arantxa Rodriguez.** 2002. "Neoliberal urbanization in Europe: Largescale urban development projects and the new urban policy". *Antipode* 34(3): 547–582.
- Plaza Beatriz.** 2006. "The return on investment of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao". *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 30(2): 452–467.
- Plaza Beatriz, Manuel Tironi, Silke N. Haarich.** 2009. "Bilbao's art scene and the "Guggenheim effect" revisited". *European Planning Studies* 17(11): 1711–1729.
- Podagrosi Angelo, Igor Vojnovic, Bruce Pigozzi.** 2011. "The diversity of gentrification in Houston's urban renaissance: From cleansing the urban poor to supergentrification". *Environment and Planning A* 43(8): 1910–1929.
- Ponzini Davide.** 2011. "Large scale development projects and star architecture in the absence of democratic politics: The case of Abu Dhabi, UAE." *Cities* 28(3): 251–259.
- Rybczynski Witold.** 2018. When buildings try too hard – Architects and developers are focused on erecting icons. Why most fall short, *The Wall Street Journal* 8 November, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122731149503149341> [access: 01.06.2021].
- Temelová Jana.** 2007. "Flagship developments and the physical upgrading of the post-socialist inner city: The Golden Angel Project in Prague". *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 89(2): 169–181.
- Thomas William I., Dorothy S. Thomas.** 1928. *The child in America: Behavior problems and programs*. New York: Knopf.
- Vicario Lorenzo, P. Manuel Martínez Monje.** 2003. "Another 'Guggenheim effect'? The generation of a potentially gentrifiable neighbourhood in Bilbao". *Urban Studies* 40(12): 2383–2400.
- Voase Richard.** 1997. "The role of flagship cultural projects in urban regeneration: A case study and commentary". *Managing Leisure* 2(4): 230–241.
- Woronkowicz Joanna, D. Carroll Joynes, Peter Frumkin, Anastasia Kolendo, Bruce A. Seaman, Robert Gertner, Norman M. Bradburn.** 2012. *Set in stone: Building America's new generation of arts facilities, 1994–2008*. Chicago: The Cultural Policy Center at the University of Chicago
- Woronkowicz Joanna, D. Carroll Joynes, Norman Bradburn.** 2014. *Building better arts facilities: Lessons from a US National Study*. Londyn: Routledge.
- Zenker Sebastian, Suzanne Beckmann.** 2013. "Measuring brand image effects of flagship projects for place brands: The case of Hamburg". *Journal of Brand Management* 20(8): 642–655.

*Jacek Gądecki
Łukasz Afeltowicz
Ilona Morawska
Karolina Anielska*

OD ROZWOJU PRZEZ KULTURĘ PO MEGA-PROJEKT. ROZSZERZONE STUDIUM PRZYPADKU NOWEGO CENTRUM ŁODZI

Streszczenie

Celem tekstu jest ukazanie specyfiki mega-projektu rewitalizacji Nowego Centrum Łodzi (NCL). Projekt został zainspirowany koncepcją efektu Bilbao/Guggenheima (na potrzeby tekstu określamy go jako model Bilbao 1 – rewitalizacja poprzez inwestycję w kulturę), jednak w toku jego implementacji przekształcił się on w kolejny mega-projekt (określany przez nas jako model Bilbao 2). Zmiana ta przyniosła poważne konsekwencje dla mieszkańców. Mega-projekty najczęściej służą jedynie wąskiej grupie beneficjentów, a ich koszt ponosi cała społeczność. Model Bilbao 1 stwarza realne szansę na społeczny rozwój miasta, podczas gdy Bilbao 2 to przede wszystkim super-gentryfikacja. W pierwszym kultura ma odgrywać autentyczną rolę w rozwoju miast, w drugim służy odwróceniu uwagi od lub legitymizacji komercyjnych inwestycji. W wielu przypadkach obecność znanych architektów i umiejscowienie funkcji specjalnych uzasadnia różnice w procedurach planowania i koncentrację ogromnych inwestycji publicznych, które tworzą realne warunki dla rynków komercyjnych i mieszkaniowych. W badaniach stosujemy metodę rozszerzonego studium przypadku. Łączymy dane z intensywnej etnografii, pogłębionych wywiadów i analizy dokumentów urbanistycznych. Jakkolwiek przypadek NCL jest po wieloma względami typowy, to wskazać można tu aspekty, które nie towarzyszyły innym mega-projektom znanym z literatury, co może uzupełnić teoretyczne i praktyczne aspekty refleksji nad mega-projektami. Dotyczy to w szczególności specyficznego modelu zarządzania projektem.

Słowa kluczowe: mega-projekt, funkcja katalityczna, projekt flagowy, regeneracja, gentryfikacja, efekt Bilbao/Guggenheim, planowanie przestrzenne