





ANDREW P. CARLIN* 
School of Education, Ulster University
YOUNHEE KIM** 
Department of English, University of Macau

PARTICULARIZATION, PLACE-RELEVANT CATEGORIES AND MORAL ORDER: KINDERGARTEN AS A “LOCAL ORGANIZATIONAL ENSEMBLE”

Abstract

Our hearings of a corpus of audio-recordings provided us, as members, with cultural resources with which to approach these for doing ethnomethodological membership categorization analysis. We began to recognize ordinary, social order properties that we suggest are features of “«parent»-«child» interaction”. Furthermore, these properties provide us with access to a “moral” order – commentaries upon accountable, expectable workings of Kindergarten (childcare centre or nursery). In the recordings a father asks his son about his activities at Kindergarten. The child’s accounts demonstrate Kindergarten is populated with members of a cohort who the father, through talk, seeks to regularize as ratified individuals. The moral order exhibited within these data is not exclusively formulated by the father: a very young child demonstrates competence in expressing his orientation to the “noticeable absence” of accountable actions. We comment on the “grammar” of categorization practices within the field of “«parent»-«child» interaction”.

Keywords: grammatical analysis, membership categorization, moral order, parent-child interaction, particularization

* Ph.D., e-mail: ap.carlin@ulster.ac.uk; <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5138-9384>

** Ph.D., e-mail: yhkim@um.edu.mo; <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7393-7767>

INTRODUCTION: MEMBERS' WORK AS FIELD-SPECIFIC RESOURCES

Anita Pomerantz [1986: 228] clarified Harold Garfinkel's concern with order, asserting that "The social order is essentially a moral order". In this preliminary paper¹, we show how an adult (Daddy) and a young child (Harry) make available for each other the existence of moral orders in the social worlds that the child inhabits.² We take the normative dimensions of social organization, which Harvey Sacks began to explore as a methodological matter in his development of conversation analysis in its categorial and sequential forms, to examine (what may be seen as) morally implicative aspects of ordinary, everyday settings. The child who features in these data is old enough (3+) to talk about events of his day – in this sense, audio-recordings are suitable materials for our inquiry, which examines the description of activities in a kindergarten rather than childcare itself. Ours is a study of practical reasoning procedures [Eglin 1979: 361], of both Harry and his father, in the description and elicitation of what happened at kindergarten.

In this paper we set out contours of doing membership categorization analysis (MCA) as coherent with ethnomethodology's program. The achievements of MCA as a radical program are being rolled back as it is subsumed into and derogated as "qualitative research". To exemplify how ethnomethodological programs are being diluted we use "«parent»-«child» interaction"³, a field wherein the foundations for analyses have been done by members themselves. Descriptions of moral order at a kindergarten are used here as a vehicle for considering the ethnomethodological properties of MCA. Ethnomethodological arguments are suffused with "«parent»-«child» interaction" data and vice versa; in this paper, these considerations are mutually informing and reflexively organized.

The *loci classici* and contextual background for our concerns include a detailed explication and history of Sacks's Membership Categorization Device (MCD) analysis, which includes the incremental logic followed by subsequent researchers in moving MCD to MCA [Hester, Eglin 1997]; an analysis that challenges "collectivity" devices [Jayussi 1984]; and the separate

¹ We thank anonymous reviewers, Lena Jayyusi (who, among her careful comments, also supplied the title) and Rod Watson (who read various iterations of this manuscript) for their generous and patient help with this study.

² The contexts of these audio recordings are detailed elsewhere [Kim, Crepaldi 2021].

³ Parent-child interaction is a research specialism within its own right. We say more about our use of scare quotes in the following section.

argument that ethnomethodological approaches are returning to constructive analysis [Button, Lynch, Sharrock 2022]. Thus, one of our contentions is that contextualized versions of MCA as formulated in *Culture in action* [Hester, Eglin 1997], emphasizing *members'* use and analysis of categories, have been undermined by analysts' priorities – imitation of previous MCA studies rather than innovation appropriate to contingent settings. Our study eschews the cognitivist profile immanent to recent MCA studies by rejecting methodologically ironic, non-praxeological explananda such as “omnirelevance”, “omnirelevant categories”, and analytically stipulated categorizations and devices, upon which the field of “«parent»-«child» interaction” depends.

The research specialism of “parent-child interaction” is categorially organized *ab initio*, though this categorial organization remains underexamined and subjacent to accumulations of empirical analyses. A mutually reinforcing citation firmament “provides a template for further investigations” [Button, Lynch, Sharrock 2022: 188], which results in studies in constructive analysis. Members who produce the data upon which “parent-child interaction” analyses proceed have done the membership work glossed as “parent-child interaction”. Their membership work is redescribed and reified into an analytic field.

We do not want to produce yet another iterative study in “«parent»-«child» interaction” that confuses members' work (the “topic” for ethnomethodology) with analysts' stipulations (a “resource” for orthodox constructive analysis) [Zimmerman, Pollner 1971]. Hence, we merely point to some generic phenomena that are taken for granted in extant studies using occasioned phenomena unique to our database, which facilitate Sacksian rather than constructive analyses. In doing so we are giving equal weight to two discrete arguments: one, that moral orders are made visible through the sequential organization of sequences in talk, which have a categorial profile according to the endogenous properties of the talk and participants' orientations to kindergarten. Second, that the categorial arrangements of talk are members' matters, not at the discretion of analysts. Talk about kindergarten instantiates how constructive analytic MCA – members use a “consistency rule” whereby categories are drawn from a single Device, i.e. treating kindergarten as an organization – brings an instructional pattern or preferred reading to analysis. Beyond the reification of categories and devices [Watson 2015] we see that constructive analytic MCA constitutes apriorism within purportedly ethnomethodological inquiries [Coulter 1983a].

We present a “grammatical analysis” [Coulter 1983b], exploring the logic of terms used by members, and by analysts claiming to represent members' orientations to their worlds. Grammatical analysis explicates the socio-logics of concepts

used by members in situ, and which are arrogated by analysts as though these practical orientations had been analytic concepts “all along” [Rose 1960]. We regard grammatical analysis as contemporaneous with rather than supplementary to empirical analysis. As records of members’ practical reasoning, we recognized that these data held an elaborative relation with extant studies of knowledge in practice, as well as studies in language socialization, interaction competence and “«parent»-«child» interaction” [Kim, Carlin 2022, 2023]. That different people “see the same things in different ways” has been a long-standing concern within ethnomethodology and conversation analysis [Coulter 1975; Cuff 1993; Eglin 1979; Pollner 1974; Schwartz 1976; Smith 1978]. This concern is balanced by the socially organized, linguistically constituted exhibition of seeing things differently by the same person [Drew 1992; Jefferson 2004a; Wooffit 1992].

In the logical grammar of ordinary language terms, seeing, understanding, knowing are interdigitated [Wittgenstein 1969] and categorially implicative, i.e. while some people *may* be in possession of certain knowledge, various categories of persons are *required* to know particular details, where failing to know something “can lead to being held responsible not (merely) for a «cognitive malfunction» but for a *moral lapse*” [Coulter 1983b: 135; emphasis in original. Cf. Coulter 1977: 348]. Listening to the recordings, it was mundanely apparent that Daddy and Harry both orientate to a “moral ordering” of a kindergarten that Harry attends. For example, producing polar assessments (such as “good” or “bad”), or on hearing a description of a context for some activity, formulating or reformulating motives for activities, which add a moral cast to how a setting could be seen to make sense. The pervasiveness of these moral orders in the data suggested that we attend these resources in “an endeavor to «repatriate» morality to a totally mundane setting” [Dupret 2011: 329].

Ethnomethodological studies suggest that a moral, accountable order is a sequential order, it is “praxeologically generated” [Jayyusi 1991: 236]. Competent membership of society is an ongoing accomplishment, displayed for each other by producing actions (such as utterances) in ways which are comprehensible to others, and through making sense of others’ actions. The “morality” of ordinary language practices has found expression through the analysis of sequences, such as impugning the credibility of a court witness who is giving evidence [Drew 1992], and membership categories. Membership categories are constituent features of ordinary language practices. They are routine, organized descriptions and identifications of individuals, relationships and associated responsibilities making sense of everyday life. They are not fixed as a taxonomy, but are indexical – occasioned in and contingent upon context.

Bringing an attitude of “ethnomethodological indifference” to analytic frameworks (including ethnomethodological ones) enables us to address phenomena, e.g. as an expression of concern, instead of explaining these away as instantiating a framework, e.g. consistency or preference rules. We hope that this preliminary investigation helps both to deflate the reification of membership categories [Watson 2015] in Sacks-inspired inquiries generally, and in “«parent»-«child» interaction” specifically. Grammatical analysis may also work to control moves back to constructive analysis [Button, Lynch, Sharrock 2022; Garfinkel, Sacks 1986] in studies of categories that apply Device-based analytic architectures to members’ occasioned descriptions.⁴

DATA FOR “«PARENT»-«CHILD» INTERACTION”

The data corpus used in this study is constituted by a series of audio recordings, between a very young child and an adult male.⁵ We shall show through the course of this paper that these are recordings of a father talking with his son (3+). They recorded their conversations over an eighteen-month period. These conversations were recorded at a time of their choosing – they were in control of the recording process – though recordings occurred at regular intervals to allow for the observation of innovations and changes over time. We are working with audio records of “«parent»-«child» conversations” in which a kindergarten is a salient setting for topics of talk. Our data provide us with elicited stories: participant versions of kindergarten, as relevant to the child; and conjectural interpretations of these versions, produced by the parent.

Enclosing “«parent»-«child»” in quotation marks is purposive [Kim, Carlin 2022]. It follows the nomenclature set out by Jefferson [2004b] to show that we are moving beyond an analytically imposed designation to a characterization evidenced by data. This involves problematizing categories that we, as analysts, may take for granted. Whilst we characterize the talk as “between a father and his son”, providing these identity terms at the outset of the paper, we take a rigorous approach to the analysis of data in terms of our own membership resources. Our characterization of the participants as father and son implicates more than an authorization procedure, that they were related as such for participation at the outset of the project; and crucially, it moves on from the stipulation of membership

⁴ As we make clear in the following section, this paper examines second-order accounts of a kindergarten produced within discussions between family members, not the organization itself.

⁵ The data corpus was collected for a wider study by Younhee Kim.

categorization pairs assumed in orthodox Sacksian analysis (parent-child, and the device “family”). To borrow a classification, this is a non-trivial matter – “important and true” [Garfinkel 2019: 111] – in that rather than trading upon cultural kinship terms as resources, we are in a position to make fully justified, data-warranted observations that do not rely upon our analysts’ assertion. The precise relationship is established by members themselves.⁶

Our “exclusive” concern with practical reasoning [Coulter 1982: 39] means that we do not accord these data any special status, by virtue of one of the participants being a very young child. As such, we see via participants’ use of address terms that this family relation is formulated in the talk itself – Daddy refers to himself as “Daddy” for the practical purposes of recipient design (Extract 1; line 10); that Daddy is not Mummy (Extract 2); Harry uses the address term “Daddy” to identify his interlocutor in situ (Extract 3, lines 6 and 9); and Daddy confirms that he is being addressed as Daddy in the next action (Extract 3, lines 7, 10). Such repetitions of address terms are seen in Extract 4, too.

Extract 1

01 D: Harry give me my pho[ne back
 02 H: [AHE::
 03 ((pause))
 04 H: [(daddy gi-)
 05 D: [you-
 06 ((pause))
 07 D: we’re supposed to be ta:lkking.
 08 you stole my phone.
 09 H: (wher how) <that’s mine>.
 10 ((pause))
 11 D: No, it’s daddy’s phone.

Extract 2

01 H: huh mama
 02 D: I’m not mummy I’m daddy right,
 03 mummy’s in the [toilet]
 04 H: [o kay]
 05 daddy?
 06 D: yea?
 07 H: daddy?
 08 D: yea?

⁶ Our concern for members’ formulations not analysts’ stipulations led to the presentation of processual transcripts, i.e. preserving but not over-describing features of talk on recordings.

Extract 3

- 01 D: Do you like you::r, white milk, the most,
 02 or do you like your chocolate milk?
 03 H: um, the er mo::st I like
 04 ()
 05 D: which one?
 06 → H: Daddy
 07 → D: yeah?
 08 ()
 09 → H: Daddy
 10 → D: yeah?
 11 H: I like the white one
 12 D: You like the white milk?

Extract 4

- 01 D: What did you write?
 02 → H: I write (.) for a note for- for Daddy
 03 → D: You write a note for Daddy?
 04 → H: Yea↑h You.
 05 → D: For me?
 06 H: Yea↑h

Self-referential third-person address terms are alluded to in extant studies [Schegloff 1996; Speier 1970; Wootton 1997] but these remain under-analysed. Our interest in these address terms for this paper is that members use these to specify the relation here and now, in and as a concrete matter, rather than an analytic stipulation, or “constituting the object”, of research into “«parent»-«child» interaction”:

constituting the object is a member’s, not an analyst’s, task; the analyst’s task is to examine *how* members constitute the object in situ [Watson 1995: 306; emphasis in original].

Not only is this paper a small step in a series of overall arguments, then, ours is a demonstration of a topic—resource distinction within “«parent»-«child»” interaction” research.

Moreover, as we shall show, we can discern parental responsibility within the organization of talk as the expression of a moral order of the kindergarten. Daddy’s orientation to Harry’s world is “parental” in the sense that the limits of Harry’s world are protected from the “outside” world. We shall see how Daddy’s orientation to affiliation with kindergarten manifests this concern; sometimes, we can hear it in his voice. For example, our membership of society allows us

to detect the father's occasioned concern and alarm at reported events, which he treats as morally implicative matters.

MORAL ORDER: PLACE-RELEVANT ACTIVITIES

There are sequences within these interactions that lend themselves to discussion of an imbalance of experiential knowledge. Since Daddy had not been with Harry during his day at kindergarten, it seems straightforward that he would be operating under an imbalance of knowledge. As he was not personally witness to the activities of Harry's time at kindergarten, access to these activities is obtained second-hand, via Harry's responses to Daddy's questions. However, among the unexpected and unexpectable contours of dealing with "wild phenomena" [Robillard 1999], e.g. naturally organized occasions of talk, we find in the audio recordings that while Daddy was not with his son during the school day, he was able, nevertheless, to engage in conversations without the sufficiency of knowledge afforded someone who had been witness to the day's events. That is, we can observe a layering of activities that Daddy takes to be accountable activities within the kindergarten setting, such as "making things" and what might be used for colouring (Extract 5).

Extract 5

- 01 D: And what did you do at school?
 02 H: Uh::m, [I
 03 D: [Did you make anything?
 04 H: I make, uh:m flowers?
 05 D: You made flo↑wers
 06 H: Yea::h, and I ((tongue clicking)) cullu:r?
 07 D: You colored? Did you use paint or did you use uhm pencil?
 08 H: Er:::: (1.4) pencil.
 09 D: Oh::, pencil
 10 H: And (0.8) tch I:: (0.5) learn for Chinese (0.5) and I- (1.2)
 11 erm time for bathe I bathe

Following analyses of witness testimony by Colonel Oliver North, in the Iran-contra hearings of 1987, we refer to these features as "moral entitlements" [Lynch, Bogen 1997a]. These moral entitlements are evidentially and inferentially available from category-predicates associated with categorical "others" who feature in stories produced within the interactions between Daddy and his son, Harry. Attention to moral entitlements enables us to look at the "*socio-logic* of members' practices" [Jayyusi 1995: 234; emphasis in original] within the development of interaction competence. Indeed, Daddy treats the kindergarten

as having a “moral geography” [Benson, Drew 1978], there being persons whose presence in kindergarten is morally expectable, e.g. classmates, teachers; and there are other persons for whom he waits further explication of their identities from Harry in assessing their entitlement to be proximate to his son.

Hence, our reference to morality is delineated not by moral philosophy, nor by directions in conversation-analytic research [Stivers, Mondada, Steensig 2011]; but is informed by a conception of a “natural or moral order” [Garfinkel 1963: 188] that is both publicly available [Jayyusi 1984, 1991] and interactionally produced [Rawls 2010]. Further, our reference to morality is circumscribed by a corpus of data in which a normative, moral order is made mundanely visible and inferentially available by parties to the ongoing talk.

Having recognized the relevance of a moral order to the kindergarten in our hearings of the recordings, a significant question for adequate analysis of these data became how could we account for what was being described by participants? In order to do this, we had to move beyond the terms of reference for institutional contexts found in constructive-analytic versions of MCA. This required a more nuanced approach than omnirelevance, standardized relational pairs, family or stage of life Devices, which are accepted features of a Device-based architecture used within extant categorial analyses of “«parent»-«child» interaction”. Such features are *mainstays* of constructive-analytic or orthodox MCA; however, as cognitivistic and reified organizations of inquiry these features are anachronistic for and incommensurate with an *ethnomethodological* MCA.

The move away from decontextualized towards occasioned categories and devices [Hester, Eglin 1997] has, over time, been “routinized” within MCA, at the expense of accounting for the haecceities of settings. Thus, this paper highlights a crucial observation that is internal and specific to the versions of MCA:

many of us [have not] been sufficiently sensitive to the reflexivities of categorisation practices, for example that a given context does not simply imbue a categorisation with its specific, “situated”, sense but also that a category reciprocally contributes to the constitution of the occasion or context as “what it (i.e. that occasion or context) actually *is*” for participants [Watson 2015: 30; emphasis in original].

As MCA becomes domesticated as a form of “qualitative” inquiry the onus on current MCA researchers is to account for the organization of activities as place and member relevant, for another first time.

It may be argued that because Daddy and Harry know that they are father-son we are falsifying the phenomenology of these discussions. We suggest instead that grammatical analysis preserves the moral order of what is being described, and does so without impacting members’ logic as formulated in the recordings, i.e.

“leaving everything as it is” [Sharrock, Anderson 1991: 62]. As such, grammatical analysis is faithful to the phenomenology of these data. Moreover, arguing that participants know that and how they are related merely confirms that the foundational work within “«parent»-«child» interaction” has already been done for analysts by members:

[Until] we have produced a description of the procedure employed for assembling cases of the class, the category is not even potentially part of the sociological apparatus. [...] To employ an undescribed category is to write descriptions such as appear in children’s books [Sacks 1963: 8].

HARVEY SACKS: NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL LIFE

In a series of methodological remarks, Harvey Sacks [Hill, Crittenden 1968; Sacks 1963, 1972, 1984, 1992] attended to the disjuncture between stated sociological procedures, e.g. what constitute “data” and how “data” should be analysed, and actual sociological practices. Sacks’s arguments, which account for his development of conversation analysis as a study of social organization, highlight (1) how sociologists use societal referents as analytic categories: in effect, relying upon the subjects of study – people – to provide the terms for sociological studies but then imposing technical meanings upon laic concepts; and (2) how sociologists render naturally occurring events immaterial to the practices of theorizing: investigating what are deemed to be sociologically relevant phenomena (what is *thought* to occur) rather than examining records of naturally organized activities (what *actually* occurs). These incompatibilities between people’s concepts and methods, with analysts’ practices, may be glossed as “asociological” [Lynch, Bogen 1997b] – a form of apriorism that is contrary to methodological principles found in textbooks. Practices of sociological theorizing are immanent to and irredeemably part of everyday life; and such theorizing refers to the same world as experienced in the attitude of daily life [Jayyusi 1995: 76]. Furthermore, descriptions consequent upon theorizing are removed from the world of everyday life [McHoul 2015].

John Heritage remarked that “The attitude of daily life is hardly the most concrete of «normative systems»” [Heritage 1984: 102], yet many of Sacks’s disquisitions would document, in fine detail, precisely this aspect of social order in the everyday. Throughout his *Lectures*, Sacks [1992] addresses the normative dimension of what people do in social settings. In methodological remarks from a lecture given in Spring 1966, predating the first publication in

conversation analysis [Schegloff 1968] seen as a seminal study in the sociological formulation of rules based upon collections of sequences of interaction, Sacks confronted the “problem” of looking at collections versus single instances.

Sacks [1992: 281ff.] addressed the normative dimension of what people actually do in social settings. Using transcripts of recorded data from group therapy sessions, Sacks observed that the use of names in introduction sequences could implicate more than, for instance, proximal positioning within a room but could refer to other aspects, which the participants to the setting found salient, such as “social status”, which both orients to and ratifies the aspect that participants regarded as operative within the introduction sequence:

for the seating order “Al, Ken, Roger”, if the introduction went off, “Al, Roger, Ken” then Al might well be able to figure that he was picked first not by virtue of his position in the room, but by virtue of something else [Sacks 1992: 283].

Sacks’s analysis in this lecture is indicative of his democratizing attitude to inquiry, and his certitude of laic (as opposed to theoretic) determinations of settings – what he would later call a “party-administered” [Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson 1974: 726] environment for interaction as it was managed in situ by parties to the conversation themselves.

Members orient to “preference” or “consistency” rules whereby introduction sequences, and the formats of names used in such sequences, provide rich detail about other members. Some utterances obtain an “achieved relatedness” [Schegloff, Sacks 1973: 295–296]. Greetings sequences, for instance, are perspicuous examples of the normative, i.e. morally given, and “sequentially implicative” nature of utterances such as “adjacency pairs” [Schegloff, Sacks 1973: 296]. Members orient to a normative organization whereby the production of a greeting is followed by a greeting return; in other words, these parts are “conditionally relevant” on each other [Schegloff 1968: 1083]. That is, a greeting requires a greeting return, and the return should (normatively) occur, specifically occurring as the relevant next action. Not to return a greeting as a relevant next action is an accountable matter – what Schegloff [1968: 1083] describes as “officially absent” – and such noticeable absences warrant the making of negative inferences.

In these terms, we can see that the normative order is a sequentially based order [Heap 1992]. In our data, Dad asks Harry about his activities during his time at kindergarten. Over a series of exchanges, Dad tries to impress upon Harry that engaging in conversation requires that he follows certain “rules”, such as being proximate to, or at least co-present with, an interlocutor (Extract 6).

Extract 6

01 D: don't walk away yeah? please sit here.
 02 H: Is it-
 03 if you walk away daddy can't see you.
 04 D: uh I can see you I just can't hear you
 05 (1.0)
 06 because you're far away from the recorder.
 07 (0.7)
 08 Yeah?

Daddy attempts to make clear to Harry that when he is asked a question, he is morally accountable to provide an answer, which is an answer to the question he has been asked (Extract 7).

Extract 7

01 D: =what did you do at school today.
 02 H: I .h recordant, .h then I play .h computers. I (3.0)
 03 eat pandas, .h then I sepray, .h then I drink .h water,
 04 .h then I play, .h I go home,
 05 .h then I see with mommy, I s:leep.
 06 (1.0)
 07 D: Okay, so you just tell me what you [were doing] all day
 08 H: [h:]
 09 we-
 10 D: WH- when you were at school today, >what d-<
 11 what did you play?

Frances Chaput-Waksler [1986] contends that a properly sociological study of children cannot be achieved until children are taken seriously *vis-à-vis* adults as sociological objects in their own right. In part, this deficiency relates to notions of membership and competence, including attributions of “half-membership” [Forrester 2017], and how these align with the ethnomethodological position on what membership entails:

persons, in that they are heard to be speaking a natural language, *somehow* are heard to be engaged in the objective production and objective display of commonsense knowledge of everyday activities as observable and reportable phenomena [Garfinkel, Sacks 1986: 163; emphasis in original].

Our data show that Harry, a very young child, engages in “moral work”, whereby he is “evaluating the «rightness» or «wrongness» of whatever is being reported” [Drew 1998: 295].

Extract 8

01 H: Ur::m yes I- I smashed my f- feet
 02 because I was really ur:gent (.) I wanted to ('hhh) pee
 03 → ('hh) but the teacher didn't let me
 04 D: Why didn't she let you pee?
 05 H: Because it was GOing home time.
 06 So- so I was so UR:gent.
 07 So you ra:n to kcare and you went to the toilet.
 08 H: No I- I ra:n to () to- I- I ran- I ran-
 09 I ran to the s:: ((sibilance))
 10 I- I- I ran to one of the coffee seat.

In Extract 8, we see an example of Harry evaluating a teacher's decision and finding it flawed. The recognition that a very young child engages in moral work problematizes the half-membership assertion and behoves us to attend the contributions of both the parent and the child. This takes seriously Waksler's [1986] argument in an approach that is grounded within linguistically organized data. Of course, there are occasions when Daddy provides an alternative interpretation of what happened. Indeed, one of the noticeable features of providing alternative interpretations is that these are located in organizationally relevant procedures, e.g. your teacher is entitled to ask you to stay. Daddy explains that within kindergarten, Harry's teacher is entitled to remonstrate with him. However, this does not detract from Harry's assessments of events at school, turning these into accountable phenomena, i.e. that Harry's reports of his day at kindergarten include instances of moral work.

BEYOND SACKS: PLACE-RELEVANT CATEGORIES

Like "sequential" conversation analysis, the analysis of membership categories was developed originally by Harvey Sacks. However, providing a series of references to Sacks's works, which are relevant to membership categorization, is problematic; ritual citation of Sacks's studies hides the slippages within Sacks's writings on the topic. Watson [2015] clarifies how Sacks was inconsistent in his approach, in ways deleterious to the EM program; how subsequent studies on MCA sought to expunge the residual cognitivism, enabling MCA to become praxiologically aligned with members' practices; and hence, how MCA could be commensurable with the EM program.

A problematic notion was "category-bound activities", a significant feature of the form of membership categorization that Sacks introduced. That activities were bound to categories connoted a taxonomic classification, which risked

falling back into constructive analysis. Watson [1978] identified this problem and suggested that category-bound activities were only one association that members relate to categories; in this important paper he drew attention to other associations and potential inferences that may be contingent upon the production of a specific category, such as “entitlements, obligations, knowledge” [Watson 1978: 106]. In the study of “«parent»-«child» interaction”, for example, “To categorize somebody as mother ... makes inferentially relevant a significant amount of knowledge concerning the categorized member, going far beyond the simple fact that she is considered to be the mother of somebody” [Keel 2016: 39]. These category associations and imputations would become glossed as “category-predicates” [Watson 1983: 41].

Another problematic area for studies of membership categorization was the notion “device”.⁷ In Sacks’s original formulations, Sacks had identified that some categories naturally went together, as “team-like units”, to form natural “devices”, such as families, sex, age, which he called “Membership Categorization Devices”. Devices were, in Sacks’s model, groups of categories that if one were selected from a group, other categories could be selected and be recognized as “belonging” to the same Device [Hester, Eglin 1997]. One of the advances of a Wittgensteinian respecification of analyses based on membership categories was the demonstration that such Devices are procedurally unnecessary [Jayyusi 1984].

While “categorization is embedded in a *moral order*” [Jayyusi 1984: 2; emphasis in original], we suggest that there is a reflexive relation where this moral order is in turn constituted by the reticulation, as a Gestalt, of sequential and categorial orders. In stripping down Sacks’s overly congested framework by using ordinary language philosophy, Jayyusi [1984] demonstrated how members disambiguate categories in situ. Membership categories are occasioned ways of doing description, and members can refine these descriptions as “moral categories” – adjudging persons so described using standards of “moral adequacy” that are recognized category-predicates [Cuff 1993: 46]. Moral categories and category-predicates can be disjunctively positioned to produce category-puzzles, e.g. what is a girl guide doing at a Hell’s Angels convention [Lee 1984], and probable category-predicates, e.g. mental illness is the “only” remaining explanation of behaviour [Smith 1978].

⁷ Although we are not producing a list, this of course does not exhaust the problems for and with MCA. The constructive-analytic cast of MCA is demonstrated by “omnirelevance”, which has become a default theoretical option (what Garfinkel called a “principled solution”) for describing settings.

The absence of “incumbents” (*sic*) of these categories, e.g. teacher not being in the classroom, are morally accountable matters (Extract 9). These categorizable cohorts are “place-relevant” categories [Jayyusi 1984: 36], features of the kindergarten which are mobilized as and when required, selected from a “local organizational ensemble” [Lena Jayyusi, personal communication]. Parents expect that during the day at kindergarten, their child will be mixing with other children, will be supervised by adults who are qualified to do so, and will engage in activities. Some of these activities will include drawing; painting; playing – with toys, in the playground, and in the sandpit; going on nature walks; etc. Parents expect that this daily round at kindergarten will also involve sequenced, scheduled activities such as eating time, nap time, and story time. The accountable nature of such “place-relevant” activities provides a resource for the mobilization of place-relevant categories, and vice versa.

01 H: I slammed- the- face because, [I
02 D: [wait, but today
03 you said that someone hit you with the door?
04 H: No, I slam:ed the door because I'm angry:.
05 D: You're angry because of the noise?
06 H: Yeah
07 D: Oh ok, well you don't need to get angry Harry.
08 You just needta () you just needta tell the teacher.
09 → H: No::, the teacher was bading for a lo:ng time.
10 D: Well, go and find her right.
11 You can find [there's not just one]
12 → H: [No, the teacher]
13 → is not here. All of the t[e a c h e r] has gone=
14 D: [>come here, come here<]
15 → H: =home a:nd if I go to the next door, no tea:cher
16 D: Well, they haven't gone home. They must be somewhere.
17 H: No, they have gone home.
18 All.

Departures from such expectations (such as teacher not being present in the classroom) are newsworthy events. In these data we see departures as accountable in the sense that Harry is required to provide further explication of these. However, from the ethnomethodological approach we take in this paper, all descriptions are accounts and, perforce, accountable. In topicalizing events through stories of what happened during the day, such as disinfecting communal toys, or by topicalizing teachers who are absent from classrooms, the moral order of the kindergarten is highlighted and elaborated.

PARTICULARIZATION: KINDERGARTEN AS A CATEGORY-RICH ENVIRONMENT

Harold Garfinkel showed that organizations are made up of categories that “go together” as organizationally associated categories, or a “system of coordinated actions” [Garfinkel 2006: 110]. Indeed, the data demonstrate that this is how Harry and his father orient to the kindergarten that Harry attends.

We wish to preserve the category-profile assigned to kindergarten organizations as formulated by Harry and his father [Watson 1986]. According to the auspices of these organizations, kindergarten constitute membership categories in themselves: the appealing names, which are replete with category-predicates, leaves no doubt that the “business” of the organizations as commercial child-care is featured in the institutional structure within which it is located – pre-school. The kindergarten as a membership categorization (or “Device”), and the place-categories which are recognized as associated with kindergarten by Harry and his father, are reflexively organized. They are mutually elaborating: the role of “the teacher” is understood with reference to the institution (pre-school); and the systemic location of the institution reflexively informs the position of the teacher, and its pupils.

These are categorial associations that competent members of society recognize. However, if we broke our analysis off at this point, we would be undermining the achievements of those who have worked to update and respecify the study of membership categorization. We can move beyond “standardized relational pairs” by looking at various “particularization procedures” which specify, in concrete detail, the constituents of “pairs” and organizational Devices such as “Kindergarten” (see extracts throughout this paper).

A trouble with producing written descriptions of membership categories for analytic purposes, is that membership categories are recognizable and potentially recognizable descriptions by and for members. Two aspects of this trouble

Rather than demonstrating relationships between categories, analysts may simply assume relationships based upon settings and their own common-sense knowledge of category incumbency. For example, asserting category-pairs such as doctor-patient, teacher-pupil, parent-child. This level of assumption was a characteristic not just of Sacks's work on membership categorization, and his colleagues, but is a feature of recent MCA, also. Studies may reference Jayyusi [1984] but do not follow through upon her respecification of category analysis using ordinary language philosophy whereby, for example, "place-categories" [Jayyusi 1984: 36] such as doctor-patient, or teacher-pupil, are not conditional on an institution, such as a hospital, or a school classroom; category-predicates are contextually contingent. Jayyusi's respecification of membership categories requires analysts not to rely upon Sacks's discriminations as "category-pairs" but just how members produce "*occasioned categorial distinctions*" [Watson 1998: 217; emphasis in original]. For example, whilst it may be conventionally, culturally assumed that parents care for their children, close attention to data allows us to move beyond constructive-analytic versions of MCA that adhere to Sacksian formulations of "stage of life" categories [Atkinson 1980] and families as "membership categorization devices".

01 H: yes we say ladybird and .h only ladybug...
02 °°°ladybug°°° hh
03 → D: yeah (.) alright then I'll get mummy to come
04 and say goodnight to [you
05 H: [no:::
06 I wanted one thousand questions.
07 D: I can't think of one thousand okay?
08 → so I'll get mummy now okay?
09 t- to say goodnight to you?

While it may be a category-bound predicate that associates mothers with saying “goodnight” to their children [cf. Keel 2016], in Extract 10 above it is *Harry’s* mother who says goodnight to Harry. Furthermore, in Extract 11, Harry describes waiting for his mum at the café beside kindergarten. Harry’s mum is a ratified

adult responsible for his welfare; she is, accountably, Harry's mum. The move we are making here is not that she is simply an incumbent of a category, a mother, but that she is recognized to be Harry's mother in particular.

Extract 11

01 H: Can you remember Dad?
 02 D: Yeah I think so [the café.
 03 H: [yah
 04 Yeah I sit at the café urm urm seats.
 05 D: Oh that sounds really nice.
 06 → H: Yeah the café bench to wait for mommy. For- for six hours.
 07 D: It wasn't six hOUrs though was it?
 08 H: Was it urm- urm-
 09 D: It was probably five minutes?
 10 H: Five minutes?

In terms of kindergarten, Harry's teacher is located and identifiable through association as a place-relevant category: this is the reflexivity of the position of the institution, and the position of a teacher within that institution. In these data (Extract 12) we see that Harry's teacher is further disambiguated through pronoun and pronominal use:

Extract 12

01 → D: Uhm, did you see Linda today, the teacher?
 02 → H: No today's is is Miz Emily
 03 D: Miss Emily? I don't know who she i:s
 04 H: He's he's the he's the, the [cook
 05 D: [she
 06 H: She:? () he's he's he:: he's uh a girl
 07 D: Yeah sh(h)e's a girl.

Harry's teacher is specified even further with reference to mutual arrangements ("Making me stay behind", Extract 13a).

Extract 13a

01 D: What did you draw
 02 H: Um, I, () I- I drew a () I kant, I cahn't think about any.
 03 Did ah- I, I drew, I [uh first, first the kids went uh
 04 D: [That's not fun
 05 H: everybody went and I had to stay. () I had to stay.
 06 D: Wh:y?
 07 H I had to stay, I did draw
 08 but first I had to stay at, at- at the, at my spot.

Requesting that a child "stay behind" is something that is a categorial entitlement: Harry's teacher is entitled to make such a request and this is seen as an

unproblematic, organizationally relevant request. Had an incumbent of another category – such as an incumbent of another place-relevant category associated with the institution – made this request, it would have been an accountable matter as to why they were asking a child to stay behind. As it is, the implication of the requester being the child's teacher is not treated as an accountable matter, for the teacher herself. On learning that Harry has been asked to stay behind does require an account, though; not from the teacher, who is entitled as his teacher to make this request, but from Harry, and in these data we see that he is asked to explain himself (Extract 13b).

Extract 13b

- 08 H: but first I had to stay at, at at the, at my spot.
 09 (0.5)
 10 → D: at your spot
 11 H: Yeh, because the teacher had to tell me impo,
 12 tell me importan tings.
 13 D: What did she have to tell you?
 14 H: He tell me, don't flap like that (.) [but
 15 D: [Did she?
 16 H: Yeh
 17 D: She told you not to flap?
 18 H: Yeah, but I wasn't happy.
 19 D: Why were you flapping?
 20 H: I didn't flap, but he told me not to. And I was angry ()
 21 becau-, becau-, because I like to flap.
 22 D: Flapping is just shaking your hands when you get excited,
 23 right?
 24 H: Yeh, but he told me not to, and I don't like dat.
 25 I like to flap my ha::nds.
 26 D: A|w|w, so this was w-, (1.0) so what were you flapping
 27 because you were happy doing something,
 28 H: [Yeh but]=
 29 D: [>an then sh-<]
 30 H: =I wasn't flapping.
 31 He just told me.
 32 D: Oh, she just, she just didn't want you to flap.

Daddy asks if this was a general request, or whether Harry had been alone when the teacher spoke to him (Extract 14):

Extract 14

34 → D: and she told you this when you're, on your own?
 35 (0.5)
 36 H: whe- wa:y [wha-
 37 → D: [or did she tell you with the children around?
 38 (0.4)
 39 → D: were they nearby? >next to you or did she speak
 40 to you alone.<
 41 (0.6)
 42 H: eh speak to me alo:ne.
 43 (0.3)
 44 D: okay en di- did you just si- did you say
 45 ye:s.
 46 (0.3)
 47 H: 'nyea:h' uh no!

In our hearing of the recording, upon realizing that Harry had been singled out for attention we think Daddy infers that the matter is serious (Extract 13b, line 10), which draws attention to the requirable account. Daddy orients to this as a behavioural issue specific to Harry, as can be seen in how Daddy treats the matter in his subsequent actions.

It is through such expressions of association and entitlement, found in Extracts 12–14, that teacher and student can be recognized to be “tied”, not simply as a stipulated category-pair of teacher-pupil, but in terms of ownership as a particularization procedure – “*my* teacher”. This coheres with the state-of-the-art of MCA [Watson 2015] and moves Sacksian analysis on from the reification of categories as category-pairs.

An interesting aspect of Harry's references to persons associated with kindergarten is whether these are recognized as “referentially adequate” [Sharrock, Watson 1989: 442]. In the previous section it was suggested that kindergarten is both a membership category in itself, and a category-rich environment – an aegis term or generalized gloss, which collocates activities, categories, and moral entitlements. Harry orients to groupings of people – those associated with kindergarten, and those outside of its auspices. In his talk, he is clear – clearer than Daddy – *who is* and *who is not* associated with kindergarten (Extract 15).

Extract 15

- 01 H: Yeh, you know why I didn't play?
 02 D: Oh Tell me why yah?
 03 H: Because, because Miss Jana say that () my auntie was
 washing the toys.
 04 My auntie is going to wash the toys.
 05 My auntie, [my auntie, uh (.)
 06 D: [is she, is she ()
 07 → H: My auntie of my school, is going to wash the toys
 08 → D: Oh, she- she works at the school?
 09 And she needs to wash th[e
 10 H: [Yeh

Within these data, Daddy queries this circle of referents. Rather than suggesting that there is a failure of recipient design by Harry, it seems to us listening to the recordings that Daddy is seeking to establish whether persons referred to by Harry are associated with kindergarten, which we regard as a visible form of parental care. In monitoring levels of “threat”, Daddy is witnessably more than an “incumbent” (*sic*) of the category “father”, he is specifically “Harry’s father”. For instance, in the following transcript (Extract 16), Harry describes “visiting a boy” – an event that Daddy finds problematic. As alarmed as he sounds at this revelation, his inquiries do not go beyond learning that this boy, “Jeremy”, also attends kindergarten, and was therefore not a threat to the safety of his son.

Extract 16

- 01 H: I wander by the playground, en after this,
 02 I- () I visit him again en af[ter
 03 D: [Harry, sit down please
 04 H: en after this, he just run I visit him then,
 05 he g[o toilet
 06 D: [>who who who<
 07 Who are you talking about
 08 H: A bo:y, boy
 09 → D: You visit a boy?
 10 H: A boy who- who who who trow the (‘hh) tissue paper=
 11 → =that one Jeremy
 12 → D: J̣eṛẹṃy?

Harry’s descriptions of his day in response to Daddy’s questions contain a series of diffuse person references, that may or may not be referentially adequate; and are not necessarily recognized as incumbents of kindergarten affiliated categories. In Sacks’s [1974: 219] terms, Daddy is not using a “consistency rule”, whereby he (hypothetically) hears a category-term associated with kindergarten and from

then hears other category-terms to be associated there too. What we hear in the recordings is a suspension of trust [Watson 2009] within the local determinations of members' talk. Rather than hearing concatenations of "relevant" categories [Sacks 1974a], Daddy selects person identifications not as hear-ably relevant but as potentially problematic, even as a potential threat, and he does so by requesting further clarifications which disambiguate identifiers. This is noticeable particularly in his tone of voice, perturbations which exhibit and betray concern for the welfare of his son.

CONCLUSION: CATEGORIZATION ACTIVITIES AND PARTICULARIZATION PROCEDURES

To reiterate some qualities of the data corpus, these recordings were self-administered by father and son, and took place at regular intervals in the home. The recordings do not document the setting of the kindergarten itself; but they do preserve talk about the son's day at kindergarten. As listeners to these recordings, we heard immediately how these occasions of talk formulated a normative organization to the kindergarten.

For analyses of categorization practices in "«parent»-«child» interaction", the risk of slippage back to constructive analysis is not just in the reproduction of empirical studies [Button, Lynch, Sharrock 2022], distinguished only by different data; it is compounded by the adoption of a Device-based architecture and its entailments, which introduce cognitivism in its anthropological and psychological modes, preventing the praxeologizing of categorization activities [Watson 2015]. In this paper we examined categorial orders within members' accounts that are located in an appropriately specified version of MCA, *viz.* a nuanced form of MCA that attends to the "logical grammar" of categories as locally occasioned descriptions of persons, or the "social organization of categorial incumbency" [Jayyusi 1984: 59]. Rather than accept a derogated array of membership categories, we attended to the accountable auspices of categories associated with place-settings, and the entailments of place-relevant categories, as formulated in the commentaries by dad and his son Harry. We have taken ethnomethodological membership categorization analysis (MCA) to explore features (or organizations) of a moral order of a kindergarten that are immanent to the talk between a father and his child. This moral order is perspicuous within second-order accounts, which are co-produced when Daddy asks Harry about his day. This ethnomethodological version of MCA allowed us to look at the "particularization procedures" that "de-reify" categories in constructive-analytic versions of categorization analysis, *i.e.*

versions that continue the programmatic abstractions of membership categorization [Sacks 1972] without accounting for the haecceities or local occasions of use.

A further benefit of grammatical analysis is that it allows us to proceed without falling into the traps of recognized frameworks for doing disciplinarily acceptable, routinized or “off-the-shelf” MCA, which is a hallmark of constructive analysis. Accounting for the logical grammar of categories enables analysis to look at whether and how categories “go together” as organizational “clusters”. Following Watson’s [1986] explication of the terms associated with an organization, we can outline some of the categorial profiles of persons under the auspices of a kindergarten. Accounting for “describer’s resources” [Twer 1972: 340] used by Harry and Daddy in their accounts, makes available the existence of the moral order of the kindergarten, and how each of them sees this order in action.

However, we have to proceed carefully when talk has been rendered in transcript format, as not all the features of a social setting can be preserved within a transcript: “members have to use their knowledge of the social world in methodic ways in order to repair the sense of transcribed materials” [Cuff 1978]. This observation consolidates the argument that “the data actually comprises our commonsense reading *and* the transcript; it is the transcript-as-read” [Watson 1995: 308; emphasis in original]. This clarifies that what we take as data in this paper are constituted by the data corpus as described above, as well as the cultural resources we bring to our listening of the recordings. What we can say with certitude is that when the recording is “inspected for what it contains” [Sharrock, Anderson 1987: 247] – until Harry provides an account of the so-far disjunctive category-incumbent that is found to be acceptable – an audible contour of Daddy’s line of questioning is distinct from surrounding talk, which we hear as Daddy expressing mild alarm in monitoring a potential threat. This prompted us to revisit the recordings from which transcripts are derived. The “inferentially relevant” [Keel 2016: 39] predicates associated with parental concern complement the overt formulation of a familial relationship within the talk, constituting further legitimation of the characterization of these data materials as “«parent»-«child» interaction”.

Studies of talk tend to emphasize sequential structures or categorial organizations within conversational extracts; however, these emphases often occur at the expense of the other [Watson 1997]. Yet studies of talk do not necessarily account for everything that is going on within a setting [Lynch 1985]. The “local content” [Drew 1992: 512] of sequences of talk between Harry and Daddy articulates a normative, moral order, which “appears at once when materials taken from everyday life are examined” [Coulter 1983b: 135]. Harry and Daddy both

engage in “doing cohorting” [Payne, Hustler 1980]. Harry’s cohorting activities are features of what Sacks [1974b] called “invited” stories; Daddy’s cohorting encourages Harry’s telling of comprehensible stories about his day at kindergarten [Kim, Carlin 2023] yet hear-ably, and at the same time, assembling members as an accountable cohort. Daddy is searching for reasons for named persons to be at Kindergarten through “particularization procedures”. Particularization procedures are more sensitive to in vivo talk than constructive-analytic appeals to the use of “consistency rules”, in this case a consistent “Kindergarten” Device.

What is hearable in these data are attempts by Daddy to rationalize or align a moral order that he assumes to be operative within the kindergarten, with the moral order that is endogenous to the kindergarten. In effect, in his exchanges with Harry, Daddy is trying to “look for and «find» the local rationality and the local morality of their rules and of their rule-making work” [Baker 1997: 98]. Daddy’s responses to Harry’s stories are to normalize newsworthy events as organizationally relevant and appropriate procedures, according to the circumstances that Harry reports; and attempt to regularize individuals as ratified members of Kindergarten as a local, organizational ensemble.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Atkinson Mick A.** 1980. “Some practical uses of «a natural lifetime»”. *Human Studies* 3(1): 33–46. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02331799>.
- Baker Carolyn D.** 1997. Ticketing rules: Categorization and moral ordering in a school staff meeting. In: *Culture in action: Studies in membership categorization analysis*. S. Hester and P. Eglin (eds.), 77–98. Washington DC: University Press of America.
- Benson Doug, Paul Drew.** 1978. “«Was there firing in Sandy Row that night?» Some features of the organisation of disputes about recorded facts”. *Sociological Inquiry* 48(2): 89–100. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-682X.1978.tb01013.x>.
- Bittner Egon.** 1973. Objectivity and realism in sociology. In: *Phenomenological sociology: Issues and applications*. G. Psathas (ed.), 109–125. New York: John Wiley.
- Button Graham, Michael Lynch, Wes Sharrock.** 2022. *Ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and constructive analysis*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Chaput-Waksler Frances.** 1986. “Studying children: Phenomenological insights”. *Human Studies* 9(1): 71–82. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00142910>.
- Coulter Jeff.** 1975. “Perceptual accounts and interpretive asymmetries”. *Sociology* 9(3): 385–396. <https://doi.org/10.1177/003803857500900301>.
- Coulter Jeff.** 1977. “Transparency of mind: The availability of subjective phenomena”. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 7(4): 321–350. <https://doi.org/10.1177/004839317700700401>.
- Coulter Jeff.** 1982. “Remarks on the conceptualization of social structure”. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 12(1): 33–46. <https://doi.org/10.1177/004839318201200102>.

- Coulter Jeff.** 1983a. "Contingent and a priori structures in sequential analysis". *Human Studies* 6(4): 361–376. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02127769>.
- Coulter Jeff.** 1983b. *Rethinking cognitive theory*. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Cuff Edward C.** 1978. "Some features of production accounting in the analysis of «conversational materials»". *Analytic Sociology* 1(4): PPA03-B02 [microfiche].
- Cuff Edward C.** 1993. *Problems of versions in everyday life*. Washington DC: University Press of America.
- Drew Paul.** 1992. Contested evidence in courtroom cross-examination: The case of a trial for rape. In: *Talk at Work*. P. Drew, J. Heritage (eds.), 470–520. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Drew Paul.** 1998. "Complaints about transgressions and misconduct". *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 31(3–4): 295–325. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08351813.1998.9683595>.
- Dupret, Baudouin.** 2011. *Adjudication in action*. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
- Eglin Peter** 1979. "Resolving reality disjunctures on Telegraph Avenue: A study of practical reasoning". *The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie* 4(4): 359–377. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3340259>.
- Forrester Michael A.** 2017. "Participation and engagement: Some possible challenges for research on early social interaction". *Research on Children and Social Interaction* 1(1): 55–76. <https://doi.org/10.1558/RCSI.30588>.
- Garfinkel Harold.** 1963. A conception of, and experiments with, "trust" as a condition of stable concerted actions. In: *Motivation and social interaction*. O.J. Harvey (ed.), 187–238. New York: Ronald Press.
- Garfinkel Harold.** 2006. *Seeing Sociologically*. Boulder CO: Paradigm.
- Garfinkel Harold.** 2019. *Parsons' Primer*. A.W. Rawls (ed.). Berlin: J.B. Meltzer.
- Garfinkel Harold, Harvey Sacks.** 1986. On formal structures of practical actions. In: *Ethnomethodological studies of work*. H. Garfinkel (ed.), 160–193. London: Routledge.
- Goode David.** 1986. "Kids, culture and innocents". *Human Studies* 9(1): 83–106. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00142911>.
- Heap James L.** 1992. Normative order in collaborative computer editing. In: *Text in context*. G. Watson, R.M. Seiler (eds.), 123–137. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Heritage John.** 1984. *Garfinkel and ethnomethodology*. Oxford: Polity.
- Hester Stephen, Peter Eglin.** 1997. Membership categorization analysis: An introduction. In: *Culture in Action: Studies in membership categorization analysis*. S. Hester, P. Eglin (eds.), 1–23. Washington DC: University Press of America.
- Hill Richard J., Crittenden, Kathleen S.** 1968. *Proceedings of the Purdue Symposium on Ethnomethodology*. Lafayette, Indiana: Institute for the Study of Social Change, Department of Sociology, Purdue University.
- Jayyusi Lena.** 1984. *Categorization and the moral order*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Jayyusi Lena.** 1991. Values and moral judgement: Communicative praxis as a moral order. In: *Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences*. G. Button (ed.), 227–251. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jayyusi Lena.** 1995. "Language, moral order and political praxis". *Argumentation* 9(1): 75–93. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00733101>.
- Jefferson Gail.** 2004a. "At first I thought": A normalizing device for extraordinary events. In: *Conversation analysis: Studies from the first generation*. G. Lerner (ed.), 131–167. Amsterdam PA: John Benjamins.

- Jefferson Gail.** 2004b. "A note on laughter in «male»-«female» interaction". *Discourse Studies* 6(1): 117–133. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461445604039445>.
- Keel Sara.** 2016. *Socialization: Parent-child interaction in everyday life*. London: Routledge.
- Kim Younhee, Andrew P. Carlin.** 2022. "«How was your day?» Development of interactional competence located in today narrative sequences". *Pragmatics* 32(2): 246–273. <https://doi.org/10.1075/prag.19043.kim>.
- Kim Younhee, Andrew P. Carlin.** 2023. "Nextness and story organization: «my day» sequences in parent-child interaction". *Text & Talk* 43(1): 21–43. <https://doi.org/10.1515/text-2020-0137>.
- Kim Younhee, Yvonne Tse Crepaldi.** 2021. "Co-constructed storytelling as a site for socialization in parent-child interaction: A case from a Malay-English bilingual family in Singapore". *Journal of Pragmatics* 172: 167–180. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2020.11.019>.
- Lee John R.E.** 1984. "Innocent victims and evil-doers". *Women's Studies International Forum* 7(1): 69–83. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395\(84\)90086-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395(84)90086-4).
- Lynch Michael.** 1985. *Art and artifact in laboratory science*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Lynch Michael, David Bogen.** 1997a. Lies, recollections and categorical judgements in testimony. In: *Culture in action: Studies in membership categorization analysis*. S. Hester, P. Eglin (eds.), 99–121. Washington DC: University Press of America.
- Lynch Michael, David Bogen.** 1997b. "Sociology's asociological «core»: An examination of textbook sociology in light of the sociology of scientific knowledge". *American Sociological Review* 62(3): 481–493. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2657317>.
- McHoul Alec W.** 2015. The humdrum. In: *The Routledge companion to global popular culture*. T. Miller (ed.), 112–118. New York: Routledge.
- Payne George, David Hustler.** 1980. "Teaching the class: The practical management of a cohort". *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 1(1): 49–66. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0142569800010104>.
- Pollner Melvin.** 1975. "«The very coinage of your brain»: The anatomy of reality disjunctures". *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 5(4): 411–430. <https://doi.org/10.1177/004839317500500304>.
- Pollner Melvin.** 1979. Explicative transactions: Making and meaning in traffic court. In: *Everyday Language: Studies in Ethnomethodology*. G. Psathas, (ed.), 227–256. New York: Irvington.
- Pomerantz Anita.** 1986. "Extreme case formulations: A way of legitimizing claims". *Human Studies* 9(2–3): 219–229. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00148128>.
- Rawls Anne W.** 2010. Social order as a moral order. In: *Handbook of the sociology of morality*. S. Hitley, S. Vaisey (eds.), 95–121. New York: Springer.
- Robillard Albert B.** 1999. "Wild phenomena and disability jokes". *Body & Society* 5(4): 61–65. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1357034X99005004006>.
- Rose Edward.** 1960. "The English record of a natural sociology". *American Sociological Review* 25(2): 193–208. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2092625>.
- Sacks Harvey.** 1963. "Sociological description". *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 8: 1–16. (reprinted 2003 in: *Harold Garfinkel, vol 2*. M. Lynch, W. Sharrock (eds.), 203–216. London: Sage).
- Sacks Harvey.** 1972. An initial investigation of the usability of conversational data for doing sociology. In: *Studies in Social Interaction*. D. Sudnow (ed.), 31–74. New York: The Free Press.
- Sacks Harvey.** 1974a. On the analyzability of stories by children. In: *Ethnomethodology: Selected readings*. R. Turner (ed.), 216–232. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Sacks Harvey.** 1974b. An analysis of a joke's telling in conversation. In: *Explorations in the ethnography of speaking*. R. Bauman, J. Scherzer (eds.), 337–353. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Sacks Harvey.** 1984. Notes on methodology. In: *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*. J.M. Atkinson, J.C. Heritage (eds.), 21–27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sacks Harvey.** 1985. The inference-making machine: Notes on observability. In: *Handbook of Discourse Analysis Volume 3: Discourse and Dialogue*. T. van Dijk (ed.), 13–23. London: Academic Press.
- Sacks Harvey.** 1992. *Lectures on Conversation*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Sacks Harvey, Emanuel A. Schegloff, Gail Jefferson.** 1974. “A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation”. *Language* 50(4): 696–735.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/412243>.
- Schegloff Emanuel A.** 1968. “Sequencing in conversational openings”. *American Anthropologist* 70(6): 1075–1095. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/669510>.
- Schegloff Emanuel A.** 1996. Some practices for referring to persons in talk-in-interaction: A partial sketch of a systematics. In: *Studies in anaphora*. B.A. Fox (ed.), 437–485. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Schegloff Emanuel A., Harvey Sacks.** 1973. “Opening up closings”. *Semiotica* 8(4): 289–327.
<https://doi.org/10.1515/semi.1973.8.4.289>.
- Schwartz Howard.** 1976. “On recognizing mistakes: A case of practical reasoning in psychotherapy”. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 6(1): 55–73.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/004839317600600104>.
- Sharrock Wes, Bob Anderson.** 1987. Work flow in a paediatric clinic. In: *Talk and social organisation*. G. Button, J.R.E. Lee (eds), 244–260. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- Sharrock Wes, Bob Anderson.** 1991. Epistemology: Professional scepticism. In: *Ethnomethodology and the human sciences*. G. Button (ed.), 51–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sharrock Wes W., D. Rodney Watson.** 1989. Talk and police work: Notes on the traffic in information. In: *Working with language. A multidisciplinary consideration of language use in work contexts*. H. Coleman (ed.), 431–449. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Smith Dorothy E.** 1978. “«K is mentally ill»: The anatomy of a factual account”. *Sociology* 12(1): 23–53. <https://doi.org/10.1177/003803857801200103>.
- Speier Matthew** 1970. The everyday world of the child. In: *Understanding everyday life*. J.D. Douglas (ed.), 188–217. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Stivers Tanya, Lorenza Mondada, Jakob Steensig.** 2011. *The morality of knowledge in conversation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Twer Sheldon.** 1972. Tactics for determining persons’ resources for depicting, contriving, and describing behavioural episodes. In: *Studies in Social Interaction*. D. Sudnow (ed.), 339–366. New York: Free Press.
- Watson Rod.** 1978. “Categorization, authorization and blame-negotiation in conversation”. *Sociology* 12(1): 105–113. <https://doi.org/10.1177/003803857801200106>.
- Watson Rod.** 1983. “The presentation of victim and motive in discourse: The case of police interrogations and interviews”. *Victimology: An International Journal* 8(1–2): 31–52.
- Watson Rod.** 1986. Doing the organization’s work: An examination of aspects of the operation of a crisis intervention center. In: *Discourse and institutional authority: Medicine, education, and law*. S. Fisher, A. Dundas Todd (eds.), 91–120. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Watson Rod.** 1995. Some potentialities and pitfalls inn the analysis of process and personal change in counselling and therapeutic interaction. In: *Professional and everyday discourse as behavior change. Towards a micro-analysis in psychotherapy process research*. J. Siegfried (ed.), 301–339. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

- Watson Rod.** 1997. Some general reflections on "categorization" and "sequence" in the analysis of conversation. In: *Culture in action: Studies in membership categorization analysis*. S. Hester, P. Eglin, (eds.), 49–75. Lanham, MD: International Institute for Ethnomethodology.
- Watson Rod.** 1998. "Ethnomethodology, consciousness and self". *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 5(2): 202–223.
- Watson Rod.** 2009. "Constitutive practices and Garfinkel's notion of trust: Revisited". *Journal of Classical Sociology* 9(4): 475–499. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X09344453>.
- Watson Rod.** 2015. De-reifying categories. In: *Advances in membership categorisation analysis*. R. Fitzgerald, W. Housley (eds.), 24–49. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Wittgenstein Ludwig.** 1969. *The blue and brown books*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wooffit Robin.** 1992. *Tales of the unexpected: Accounts of paranormal experiences*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Wootton Anthony J.** 1997. *Interaction and the development of mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wowk Maria T.** 1989. Talk in an organization: Organization in talk. In: *Working with language*. H. Coleman (ed.), 541–564. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Zimmerman Don H., Melvin Pollner.** 1971. The everyday world as a phenomenon. In: *Understanding everyday life: Toward the reconstruction of sociological knowledge*. J.D. Douglas (ed.), 80–103. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Andrew P. Carlin
Younhee Kim

USZCZEGÓLOWIENIE, KATEGORIE ISTOTNE DLA MIEJSCA I PORZĄDEK MORALNY: PRZEDSZKOLE JAKO „LOKALNY ZESTAW ORGANIZACYJNY”

Streszczenie

Odsłuchiwanie korpusu nagrań dźwiękowych dostarczyło nam – jako uczestnikom (ang. *members*) – zasobów kulturowych, za pomocą których mogliśmy przystąpić do etnometodologicznej analizy kategoryzacji uczestnictwa (ang. *membership categorization analysis*). Zaczęliśmy rozpoznawać zwyczajne właściwości porządku społecznego, które – jak proponujemy – są cechami interakcji typu „rodzic»-«dziecko». Właściwości te umożliwiają nam dostęp do porządku „moralnego” – rozumianego jako komentarze odnoszące się do wytłumaczalnej (ang. *accountable*) i oczekiwanej działalności przedszkola. W analizowanych nagraniach ojciec pyta syna o jego aktywności w przedszkolu. Relacje (ang. *accounts*) dziecka ukazują, że przestrzeń przedszkolna jest wypełniona uczestnikami kohorty, których ojciec – poprzez rozmowę – stara się zatwierdzić (ang. *regularize*) jako ratyfikowanych uczestników lokalnego zestawu organizacyjnego (ang. *local organizational ensemble*). Eksponowany w tych danych porządek moralny nie jest jednak formułowany wyłącznie przez ojca: bardzo małe dziecko wykazuje kompetencję w wyrażaniu swojego odnoszenia się do „zauważalnej nieobecności” wytłumaczalnych działań. Komentujemy tu „gramatykę” praktyk kategoryzacyjnych w ramach „interakcji «rodzic»-«dziecko»”.

Słowa kluczowe: „analiza gramatyki” (praktyk kategoryzacyjnych), kategoryzacja uczestnictwa (ang. *membership categorization*), porządek moralny, interakcja rodzic-dziecko, uszczegółowienie (ang. *particularization*)