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A NEW GLOBAL ORDER EMERGING UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP'S REALPOLITIK

Abstract

Background: Trump-era policies pushed against key neoclassical assumptions: trade protectionism instead of free trade, pressure to reshore manufacturing, prioritizing national over global efficiency. The 21st. century has been marked by a gradual erosion of the liberal international order and the rule of law that emerged after World War II. The American president D. Trump has rejected these premises. He treated globalization not as positive sum process but as a mechanism of exploitation by foreign states and corporations of American workers. He broke with 200 years tradition of “free trade”. His policy goes against the classic neoclassical emphasis on comparative advantages and open markets.

Research purpose: The question arises whether this new policy can be considered as a permanent trend of the American policy or just the passing whim of an authoritarian US leader. The authors try to answer if these measures can have a real long term impact on the neoclassical path of development and globalization.

Methods: Authors use qualitative methods (mainly literature review and observations)

Conclusion: The analysis leads to the conclusion that the classical fundamentals of the neoclassical theory will certainly be modified. We cannot say yet to what extent these modifications will take place: which parts of neoclassical theory are fading fastest, and which are still very much alive.

Keywords: the neoclassical theory, globalization, free trade, protectionism, D. Trump policies.

JEL classification: F00, F02, F11, F59, F41

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1. Introduction

The early decades of the twenty-first century have been marked by a gradual erosion of the liberal international order that emerged after World War II and reached its zenith after the US President threatened to take over land belonging to one of its allies.¹ For more than seventy years, this order rested on a combination of: security alliance of NATO, open markets, multilateral institutions, and the presumption of American leadership exercised through rules rather than raw power.²

The institutions created at Bretton Woods, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, later the World Trade Organization, and the dense web of U.S.-led alliances formed a coherent architecture that constrained power through law and embedded American dominance in a rules-based framework.³

The presidency of Donald Trump represented a decisive break with this tradition.⁴ Rather than presenting a coherent grand strategy in the classical sense, Trump's approach amounted to a form of modern *realpolitik*: skeptical of institutions, impatient with allies, indifferent to norms, and unapologetically focused on relative power and immediate national advantage.⁵ His worldview was less shaped by Wilsonian idealism than by a nineteenth-century understanding of international politics as a contest among sovereign states pursuing security, wealth, and status.⁶ The DONROE doctrine was born to paraphrase the Monroe Doctrine of the early 19th century, in which the USA essentially claimed ownership of Latin America.⁷

¹ **G.J. Ikenberry**, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2011; **S.M. Walt**, *The Predatory Hegemon: How Trump Wields American Power*, Foreign Affairs 2026/105/2.

² **G.J. Ikenberry**, *Liberal Leviathan...*

³ **U.S. Department of State**, *Bretton Woods-GATT, 1941–1947*, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/bretton-woods>; accessed 30.03.2026; **World Trade Organization**, *The History of the Multilateral Trading System*, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/history_e/history_e.htm; accessed 30.03.2026.

⁴ **S.M. Walt**, *The Predatory...*

⁵ *Ibidem*; **W.R. Mead**, *The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order*, Foreign Affairs 2017/96/2, pp. 2–7.

⁶ **J.J. Mearsheimer**, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*, Yale University Press, New Haven 2018.

⁷ **J. Monroe**, *Seventh Annual Message to Congress*, December 2, 1823, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-2-1823-seventh-annual-message-monroe-doctrine>; accessed 29.03.2026.

President Trump ended “Pax Americana” and ushered a system dominated by power politics among the United States, China, Russia, and India.⁸ Each of these shifts represents not merely a policy adjustment, but a deeper transformation in how the United States conceives of its role in the world and how the international system itself is being reorganized.

2. From globalism to economic nationalism

For decades, U.S. economic policy was anchored in the belief that globalization served both American prosperity and global stability.⁹ Successive administrations promoted trade liberalization, financial integration, and the expansion of global value chains.¹⁰ Under this logic, American firms would specialize in high-value activities, consumers would benefit from cheaper imports, and political cooperation would follow economic interdependence.¹¹

The integration of China into the world economy after 2001 was widely interpreted as the final step in the universalization of the liberal model.¹²

Trump rejected this premise.¹³ He treated globalization not as a positive-sum process, but as a mechanism through which foreign states and multinational corporations exploited American workers.¹⁴ His rhetoric framed the United States as a victim of unfair competition, manipulated trade agreements, and predatory industrial policies abroad. Economic nationalism became the guiding principle: borders mattered again, supply chains were suspect, and domestic production was equated with national strength.¹⁵

⁸ **S.M. Walt**, *The Predatory...*; **R.N. Haass**, *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order*, Penguin Press, New York 2017.

⁹ **D. Rodrik**, *The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy*, W.W. Norton, New York 2011.

¹⁰ **R. Baldwin**, *The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2016.

¹¹ **R.O. Keohane, J.S. Nye Jr.**, *Power and Interdependence*, 4th ed., Longman, Boston 2012.

¹² **World Trade Organization**, *The History...*; **Office of the United States Trade Representative**, *Background Information on China's Accession to the WTO*, https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2001/Background_Information_on_China's_Accession_to_the_World_Trade_Organization.html; accessed 26.03.2026.

¹³ **S.M. Walt**, *The Predatory...*

¹⁴ **P. Navarro, G. Autry**, *Death by China: Confronting the Dragon – A Global Call to Action*, Pearson Education, Upper Saddle River 2011.

¹⁵ **D. Rodrik**, *Populism and the Economics of Globalization*, *Journal of International Business Policy* 2018/1, pp. 12–33.

This shift had two important consequences.

First, it redefined economic policy as an instrument of sovereignty rather than efficiency.¹⁶ Trade, investment, and technology flows were subordinated to national security and political leverage.

Second, it eroded the moral foundation of the liberal order. Where earlier leaders spoke the language of shared prosperity and global governance, Trump spoke the language of zero-sum competition and national revival.¹⁷ The United States ceased to present itself as the custodian of a common system and instead behaved as one power among others in a contested hierarchy.

3. From a strong dollar to tolerance of a weaker dollar

Since the 1990s, U.S. policy has consistently affirmed a “strong dollar” doctrine.¹⁸ A strong currency symbolized confidence in American institutions, supported the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency, and facilitated low inflation through cheap imports.¹⁹ The strong-dollar policy also underpinned the United States’ unique ability to finance deficits cheaply and to wield power through the global financial system.²⁰

Trump disrupted this tradition. He repeatedly criticized a strong dollar as harmful to American exporters and advantageous to foreign competitors, particularly China and the euro area.²¹ For the first time in decades, a U.S. president openly welcomed the idea of a weaker dollar as a tool of industrial and trade policy.²² Exchange rate policy, once treated as a technocratic domain, became politicized.

¹⁶ **H. Farrell, A.L. Newman**, *Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion*, International Security 2019/44/1, pp. 42–79.

¹⁷ **S.M. Walt**, *The Predatory...*; **D. Rodrik**, *Populism and...*

¹⁸ **B. Eichengreen**, *Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar*, Oxford University Press, New York 2011.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ **A. Tooze**, *Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World*, Viking, New York 2018.

²¹ **Reuters**, *Trump Says Strong Dollar Hurting U.S. Competitiveness*, March 3, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/trump-says-strong-dollar-hurting-us-competitiveness-idUSKCN1QK034/>; accessed 23.03.2026; **Reuters**, *Trump Criticizes U.S. Dollar’s Strength, Blames the Fed*, August 8, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/business/trump-criticizes-us-dollars-strength-blames-the-fed-idUSKCN1UY1Y6/>; accessed 26.03.2026.

²² **Reuters**, *Trump Criticizes...*

This shift reflected a deeper reordering of priorities. Instead of viewing the dollar primarily as a global public good, Trump treated it as an instrument of competitiveness. The implicit trade-off was clear: short-term export gains were valued more than the long-term privileges of monetary hegemony.²³ Although the Federal Reserve remained institutionally independent, presidential rhetoric alone introduced uncertainty into the foundations of the international monetary system.²⁴

More broadly, this move signaled a retreat from financial leadership. A strong and stable dollar underpinned U.S. influence over global capital markets and sanctions regimes.²⁵ By questioning this orthodoxy, the administration weakened the perception of the dollar as a neutral anchor of the system and encouraged other powers to explore alternatives, however imperfect or limited they might be.

4. From comparative advantage to managed trade

Classical trade theory rests on the principle of comparative advantage: countries specialize according to relative efficiency, trade expands total welfare, and distributional conflicts are managed domestically.²⁶ For most of the postwar period, this framework justified U.S. support for free trade agreements and multilateral rules.²⁷ Deviations from free trade were treated as exceptions rather than as the organizing principle of policy.

Trump rejected this logic almost entirely. He treated trade balances as indicators of success or failure, rather than as accounting identities reflecting savings and investment.²⁸ Persistent trade deficits were interpreted as evidence of exploitation rather than as the macroeconomic outcome of domestic choices. American's benefited from cheap imports while at the same time deindustrialized

²³ **B. Eichengreen**, *Exorbitant Privilege...*; **A. Tooze**, *Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World*, Viking, New York 2018.

²⁴ **Reuters**, *Trump Criticizes...*

²⁵ **H. Farrell, A.L. Newman**, *Weaponized...*

²⁶ **D. Ricardo**, *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, John Murray, London 1817; **P.R. Krugman, M. Obstfeld, M.J. Melitz**, *International Economics: Theory and Policy*, 11th ed., Pearson, Boston 2018.

²⁷ **D.A. Irwin**, *Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2017.

²⁸ **D.A. Irwin**, *Trump's Trade Policy Is a Prequel, Not an Outlier*, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 2020/34/4, pp. 70–90.

large segments of the North Eastern part of the USA. Managed trade replaced market coordination through tariffs, quotas, and bilateral bargaining.²⁹

It would be naïve, however, to treat managed trade as the invention of President Trump or as a uniquely American deviation from orthodoxy. Managed trade, subsidies, and industrial policy have been central features of China's economic model for decades.³⁰ State-owned enterprises, directed credit, technology transfer requirements, and export subsidies created a system that systematically distorted competition.³¹ In this sense, American managed trade was not the cause of the breakdown of the liberal order, but a response to it.

From this perspective, Trump's policy can be interpreted as an attempt to confront an asymmetrical system with symmetrical instruments. Economists would argue, correctly in theory, that protectionism reduces welfare and undermines efficiency.³² Yet reality, rather than theory, became the decisive guide. When faced with a strategic competitor that rejected reciprocity, rule-based trade appeared less as a solution and more as a vulnerability.³³

This does not mean that managed trade is the best system for the future. It does mean that the world Trump confronted no longer resembled the world assumed by classical trade theory. In a system where states systematically manipulate markets, the boundary between economic policy and national security inevitably dissolves.³⁴

5. From low tariffs to high tariffs

For seventy years, the United States had been the principal architect of tariff reduction.³⁵ Average tariff rates fell steadily from the 1940s onward, reinforcing the expansion of global trade and the credibility of American leadership. Low tariffs were both an economic policy and a symbol of systemic responsibility.

²⁹ **C.P. Bown**, *The US-China Trade War and Phase One Agreement*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington 2020.

³⁰ **B. Naughton**, *The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth*, 2nd ed., MIT Press, Cambridge 2018.

³¹ **B. Naughton**, *The Chinese Economy...*; **H. Farrell, A. L. Newman**, *Weaponized...*

³² **P.R. Krugman, M. Obstfeld, M.J. Melitz**, *International Economics...*

³³ **C.P. Bown**, *The US-China...*

³⁴ **H. Farrell, A.L. Newman**, *Weaponized...*

³⁵ **D.A. Irwin**, *Clashing over...*; **Office of the Historian**, *Bretton Woods-GATT, 1941-1947*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/bretton-woods>; accessed 30.03.2026.

Trump reversed this trajectory. Tariffs became the central instrument of foreign economic policy.³⁶ They were imposed not only for traditional protectionist purposes, but as tools of diplomatic pressure, fiscal leverage, and domestic political signalling. The average effective tariff rate rose to levels unseen in decades.³⁷

This shift reintroduced uncertainty into global markets. Firms could no longer assume stable access to the U.S. market. Supply chains were disrupted, investment decisions postponed, and the credibility of U.S. commitments weakened.³⁸ Tariffs, once an exception, became normalized.

More fundamentally, tariff policy reflected a philosophical break. Trade liberalization was no longer treated as an objective in itself, but as a concession to be granted only when it produced immediate and visible gains. The long-term logic of openness gave way to the short-term logic of bargaining power.

6. From alliances to transactional security

Since 1945, U.S. alliances rested on collective defense and shared responsibility.³⁹ Although burden-sharing disputes were common, the strategic commitment itself was rarely questioned. Alliances were not contracts to be renegotiated, but institutions designed to shape behavior and prevent war.

Trump treated alliances as transactions rather than communities.⁴⁰ He measured their value in financial terms and openly questioned the automaticity of U.S. defense commitments. NATO, in particular, was portrayed less as a pillar of order and more as a cost center. The possibility of withdrawing U.S. troops from Europe became a recurring theme.⁴¹

From a realist perspective, this policy had a certain internal logic. It was unrealistic to assume that European states would significantly increase defense

³⁶ C.P. Bown, *The US-China...*

³⁷ K.A. Clausung, M. Obstfeld, *Tariffs as Fiscal Policy*, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper 25–19 September 2025, <https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/2025/tariffs-fiscal-policy>; accessed 26.03.2026.

³⁸ C.P. Bown, *The US-China...*

³⁹ G.J. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan...*; NATO, *Collective Defence and Article 5*, updated November 12, 2025, <https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/collective-defence-and-article-5>; accessed 26.03.2026.

⁴⁰ S.M. Walt, *The Predatory...*

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

spending without credible pressure. Article 5, the mutual defense clause of NATO, had created a moral hazard: protection without proportional responsibility.⁴²

The unreliability of U.S. policy under Trump became a much-needed wake-up call for Europeans. The Russian attack on Ukraine exposed the strategic lethargy of affluent societies. With the partial exception of Poland, Sweden, and Norway, much of Europe remained unwilling to bear the full costs of deterrence. Energy dependence, fiscal complacency, and political fragmentation limited strategic autonomy.

Trump's brutal call for the acquisition of Greenland, while diplomatically shocking, revealed a deeper geostrategic logic. The Arctic, once peripheral, had become central to great-power competition. By forcing the issue into public debate, Trump reintroduced realism into European security discourse. In this sense, transactional pressure, however crude, accelerated a long-delayed adjustment to power politics.

7. From Pax Americana to multipolar power politics

The post-Cold War order was often described as unipolar.⁴³ The United States possessed unmatched military, economic, and institutional power. Although challengers existed, none could plausibly contest American primacy.

Under Trump, this vision was explicitly abandoned.⁴⁴ The world was reimagined as a competitive arena dominated by great powers: the United States, China, Russia, and, increasingly, India. Norms, institutions, and rules were treated as secondary to relative power and strategic positioning.

This shift normalized spheres of influence and tacit accommodation with authoritarian powers. It reduced the space for middle powers and multilateral institutions. The international system moved closer to a nineteenth-century logic of balance of power, in which stability depended not on law, but on deterrence and rivalry.⁴⁵

⁴² **NATO**, *Collective Defence...*; **B.R. Posen**, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2014.

⁴³ **W.C. Wohlforth**, *The Stability of a Unipolar World*, *International Security* 1999/24/1, pp. 5–41.

⁴⁴ **S.M. Walt**, *The Predatory...*

⁴⁵ **J.J. Mearsheimer**, *The Great Delusion...*

The world with or without the United States

In 2026, the United States will mark the 250th anniversary of its founding.⁴⁶ This milestone has prompted renewed debate among scholars and historians over whether Donald Trump's presidency represents a transformational moment in American history. At stake in these discussions is a larger question: does this presidency signal the emergence of a new form of American hegemony, or does it instead reflect the gradual limits of American global power?

One influential interpretation comes from Stephen M. Walt, who characterizes Trump's foreign policy as a strategy of "predatory hegemony." Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Walt argues that the United States is increasingly using its structural advantages in the international system not to sustain a cooperative global order but to extract unilateral benefits from other states.⁴⁷ The central objective of this strategy, he suggests, is to leverage Washington's privileged position to obtain concessions, tribute, and symbolic displays of deference from both allies and adversaries.

In such a framework, alliances and international institutions cease to function as long-term mechanisms of collective stability. Instead, they become transactional instruments through which the United States pressures other states – through tariffs, security guarantees, or diplomatic leverage – to improve bilateral terms in its favor. A predatory hegemon, in Walt's formulation, does not clearly distinguish between partners and rivals; it seeks advantage in every interaction. While such an approach may generate short-term gains, Walt warns that it ultimately risks undermining the networks of trust and cooperation that have historically underpinned American influence. Over time, allies may reduce their dependence on the United States or seek alternative strategic alignments, potentially eroding the foundations of American leadership.⁴⁸

Recent events – from tensions with Iran to political developments in Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro and pressure on the Cuban regime – illustrate how actions taken in Washington continue to reverberate globally. Yet the notion that the United States could sustain itself as a predatory hegemon faces serious structural constraints. Two factors in particular limit such a possibility: the historical pattern of American engagement abroad and the political culture of American society.

⁴⁶ **U.S. Department of State**, official materials on the 250th anniversary of the United States, <https://www.state.gov/freedom-250>; accessed 26.03.2026.

⁴⁷ **S.M. Walt**, *The Predatory...*

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.

The limits of American imperial practice

Historically, the United States has demonstrated limited capacity – or inclination – for sustained colonial governance.⁴⁹ If the essence of colonial rule lies in the systematic economic and administrative exploitation of conquered territories, the United States has rarely pursued this model consistently or effectively.

American military interventions have often aimed instead at shaping political outcomes rather than administering territory.⁵⁰ During the twentieth century, the United States supported or installed compliant regimes in parts of Latin America and in conflicts such as Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In other cases – most notably after the Second World War – it oversaw the reconstruction of defeated states such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea, helping to establish stable political institutions and integrated economies.⁵¹

However, where the United States has attempted prolonged direct administration – as in Afghanistan or Iraq – the results have been far more ambiguous.⁵² These experiences reveal a persistent gap between American military capabilities and the administrative, cultural, and institutional frameworks required for long-term imperial governance. Earlier colonial powers such as Britain, Russia, Germany, and the Netherlands developed extensive bureaucratic traditions and institutional practices designed specifically for managing overseas territories. The United States, by contrast, has generally lacked both the institutional culture and domestic political support necessary for such projects.

Isolationism and domestic political constraints

Equally significant are the domestic political constraints that shape American foreign policy. Despite its global military presence, American political culture has long contained a strong current of isolationism.⁵³ While the United States periodically engages in major international conflicts, these interventions are typically framed as temporary and exceptional rather than permanent commitments.

⁴⁹ **G.J. Ikenberry**, *Liberal Leviathan...*; **J.A. Engel, M.A. Lawrence, A. Preston** (eds.), *America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2014.

⁵⁰ **J.A. Engel, M.A. Lawrence, A. Preston** (eds.), *America in the World...*

⁵¹ **G.J. Ikenberry**, *Liberal Leviathan...*

⁵² *Ibidem*.

⁵³ **C.A. Kupchan**, *Isolationism: A History of America's Efforts to Shield Itself from the World*, Oxford University Press, New York 2020.

Sustaining long-term military involvement abroad requires political justification that can withstand domestic scrutiny. In practice, such justification becomes increasingly difficult as conflicts extend in duration and costs accumulate. American voters often interpret international conflicts through simplified moral narratives – distinguishing between “good” and “bad” actors – an approach that can mobilize public support in the short term but rarely sustains complex strategic engagements over time.⁵⁴

Ultimately, the domestic political calculus of foreign policy tends to revolve around everyday economic concerns: energy prices, employment, and the cost of living. When foreign commitments appear to threaten these priorities, public support for overseas engagement rapidly diminishes. For this reason, large-scale deployments of American ground forces in regions such as the Middle East, or elsewhere by President Trump, remain politically difficult or impossible to sustain. These constraints impose a natural limit on any strategy that would attempt to transform the United States into a durable predatory hegemon.⁵⁵

8. Concluding remarks

This article advances a more balanced interpretation of the emerging global economic and political order. The end of the Cold War was not simply the result of military superiority or nuclear deterrence. Rather, it reflected the cumulative effects of systemic exhaustion and institutional adaptation within the international system.⁵⁶

In the twenty-first century, the foundations of geopolitical success are shifting. The decisive factors are no longer defined solely by military strength but by a broader strategic triad: Diplomacy, Economic efficiency, and Technological creativity (DET). Together, these elements will increasingly determine which states succeed in a more complex global environment.⁵⁷

Much contemporary discussion revolves around the concept of a “multipolar world.” Yet this term is often invoked without a clear analytical meaning. It frequently serves as a shorthand for uncertainty rather than a precise description

⁵⁴ C.A. Kupchan, *Isolationism...*; G.J. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan...*

⁵⁵ S.M. Walt, *The Predatory...*; C.A. Kupchan, *Isolationism...*

⁵⁶ J.L. Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, Penguin Press, New York 2005.

⁵⁷ J.S. Nye Jr., *The Future of Power*, Public Affairs, New York 2011.

of the emerging international structure. While the distribution of power may indeed be broadening, the exact contours of a multipolar order remain uncertain.⁵⁸

What can be identified with greater confidence are several structural realities that define the early decades of the twenty-first century. Nuclear deterrence remains a stabilizing factor in international politics; no state has used nuclear weapons to secure global dominance since 1945.⁵⁹ At the same time, the particular form of globalization that characterized the late twentieth century – driven by low tariffs, free capital flows, and large American trade deficits – has begun to erode.⁶⁰

Institutions such as NATO will therefore face increasing pressure to adapt to new strategic realities.⁶¹ At the same time, contrary to the expectations of traditional realist theory, medium-sized states may find themselves in an unexpectedly advantageous position.⁶²

In a system where great powers must continuously cultivate alliances and partnerships, medium-sized states acquire greater strategic relevance. Their capacity to maneuver diplomatically, compete economically, and innovate technologically allows them to exert influence disproportionate to their size. Mastery of the DET triad can enable these states not merely to survive but to prosper.⁶³

The nuclear endgame – total confrontation between great powers – remains an implausible and self-defeating option. In the emerging global order, success will depend less on the size of a country's arsenal than on its capacity for strategic flexibility. Medium-sized states will increasingly learn to navigate among competing centers of power, shaping outcomes through diplomacy, economic integration, and technological adaptation.⁶⁴

At the same time, the world is now entering a period of exponential transformation unlike any previous stage of industrial or geopolitical development. The rise of General Artificial Intelligence (GAI), followed potentially by forms of Super Artificial Intelligence, may alter the foundations of economics, politics, labor, and even human identity within the next five to ten years. The speed

⁵⁸ **R.N. Haass**, *A World in Disarray...*; **J.J. Mearsheimer**, *The Great Delusion...*

⁵⁹ **S.D. Sagan**, **K.N. Waltz**, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, W.W. Norton, New York 2002.

⁶⁰ **D. Rodrik**, *The Globalization...*; **C.P. Bown**, *The US-China...*

⁶¹ **NATO**, *Collective Defence...*

⁶² **R.N. Haass**, *A World in Disarray...*; **C.A. Kupchan**, *Isolationism...*

⁶³ **J.S. Nye Jr.**, *The Future...*

⁶⁴ **S.D. Sagan**, **K.N. Waltz**, *The Spread...*; **R.N. Haass**, *A World in Disarray...*

of technological change is beginning to exceed the adaptive capacity of many traditional institutions.

The implications for the global economy are likely to be profound. Entire sectors of white-collar and analytical labor may undergo rapid automation, including finance, logistics, law, education, administration, engineering, and parts of scientific research. Productivity gains could become extraordinary, but they may also produce severe social dislocation if wealth generated by intelligent systems remains concentrated in a small number of corporations, technological platforms, or states.

Economic competition will increasingly revolve around control over algorithms, quantum computing, semiconductor production, energy systems, rare earth minerals, and advanced data infrastructure. In this environment, technological sovereignty may become as important as territorial sovereignty once was in the industrial age.

The traditional concept of the nation-state may also gradually evolve. Digital networks, virtual economies, decentralized finance, immersive virtual environments, and transnational technological communities are already weakening purely territorial understandings of political and economic organization. Over time, humanity may move toward forms of universal interconnectedness that blend the physical and virtual worlds into a single civilisational space.

Yet this transformation also raises deeper philosophical questions. As artificial systems become increasingly capable of performing intellectual and creative tasks once considered uniquely human, the meaning of human existence itself may become more central rather than less important. Human qualities such as moral judgment, empathy, consciousness, cultural identity, creativity, spirituality, and the search for meaning may emerge as the defining comparative advantages of humanity in an AI-driven age.

The global economy of the future may therefore become increasingly polarized between extraordinary technological abundance and profound social uncertainty. Some societies may successfully adapt through education, institutional flexibility, and technological innovation, while others may experience instability caused by inequality, demographic decline, political fragmentation, and the erosion of traditional labor structures.

In such a world, the most successful societies may not necessarily be those with the largest military forces or populations, but those capable of combining technological advancement with social cohesion, ethical governance, and human adaptability. The ability to integrate artificial intelligence into economic systems

without destroying political legitimacy or social stability may become the decisive challenge of the twenty-first century.

In this evolving landscape, power will not belong exclusively to the largest states. Rather, it will belong to those capable of combining strategic restraint with institutional innovation – an approach that may ultimately define the politics and economics of the twenty-first century.

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NOWY ŚWIATOWY PORZĄDEK GOSPODARCZY I POLITYCZNY WYŁANIAJĄCY SIĘ W RAMACH REALPOLITYKI PREZYDENTA TRUMPA

Abstrakt

Przedmiot badań: Polityka ery Trumpa stanowiła wyzwanie dla kluczowych założeń neoklasycznych: protekcjonizm handlowy zamiast wolnego handlu, nacisk na relokalizację produkcji oraz przedkładanie efektywności krajowej nad globalną. XXI w. charakteryzuje się stopniową erozją liberalnego porządku międzynarodowego i praworządności, które wyłoniły się po II wojnie światowej. Amerykański prezydent D. Trump odrzucił te założenia. Traktował globalizację nie jako proces o sumie dodatniej, ale jako mechanizm wyzysku amerykańskich pracowników przez obce państwa i korporacje. Zerwał z 200-letnią tradycją „wolnego handlu”. Jego polityka jest sprzeczna z klasycznym neoklasycznym naciskiem na przewagę komparatywne i otwarte rynki.

Cel badawczy: Powstaje pytanie, czy tę nową politykę można uznać za trwały trend w polityce amerykańskiej, czy też jest to jedynie przejściowy kaprys autorytarnego przywódcy USA. Autorzy próbują odpowiedzieć na pytanie, czy polityka taka mieć będzie długoterminowy wpływ na neoklasyczną ścieżkę rozwoju i globalizacji.

Metoda badawcza: Autorzy stosują metody jakościowe (głównie przegląd literatury i obserwacje).

Wyniki: Analiza prowadzi do wniosku, że klasyczne podstawy teorii neoklasycznej z pewnością ulegną modyfikacji. Nie możemy jeszcze stwierdzić, w jakim stopniu modyfikacje te nastąpią, które elementy teorii neoklasycznej znikną najszybciej, a które pozostaną aktualne.

Słowa kluczowe: teoria neoklasyczna, globalizacja, wolny handel, protekcjonizm, polityka D. Trumpa.